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ABSTRACT
Distinctive technology and customer / supplier relationships are currently the primary sources of
competitive advantage in the Aerospace industry. Modular Open System Architecture (MOSA)
requirements represent a significant disruption to this mode of competition. The United States
Department of Defense intends to accelerate the rate of aerospace innovation and inject
additional competitiveness into the procurement process through the modularization of its
products and effective intellectual property management. This combination of architectural
disruption and new customer capabilities has the potential to reduce the industry's opportunity to
capture value from innovative technologies or a position as first supplier.
Historical examples such as Polaroid and IBM demonstrate the organizational paralysis that
often results from disruptions in product architecture. The competitive formula becomes
ingrained in the processes, resources, and culture of mature companies and is no longer explicit
knowledge, which limits the company's ability to develop the capabilities required to compete in
its new environment. Competing in a MOSA environment will require the development of new
organizational capabilities such as rapid experimentation, fighting standards wars, and protecting
system-level knowledge. Defining the disruptive threat and the foundations of current core
competencies will enable firms to develop the organizational capabilities essential for this shift
in competitive context.
The author will present several historical examples of architectural disruption, a framework for
evaluating the disruptive change, and an identification of organizational anchors that may hinder
a particular competitor's ability to respond to MOSA. The goal of the thesis is to start a dialogue
within an identified incumbent with in hopes of beginning the organizational transformation
required to effectively compete in this new era.
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Title: Senior Lecturer
This page has been intentionally left blank
_ ____~ _I *LI____I_~__~_LI~~
___1* 1^ _r__l___I_~_~______ 1____1_ ___1  ~1
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... ...................... 5
Table of Figures .............................................................................................................. ......................... 7
1. Introduction............................................ ................................. . ............................ 9
1.1. U.S. Department of Defense Acquisition Program Performance.................................... 9
1.2. M odular Open System Architecture Requirem ents ...................................................... 10
1.3. Thesis Structure.............................................................................................................. 12
2. M odular and Open Product Architectures..................... .................................... ..................... 13
2.1. Definition of M odularity .............................................................................................. 13
2.2. M odular Design Processes ............................................................................................ 15
2.3. Lim itations of M odularization in Practice .................................................................... 19
2.4. Firm Benefits of M odular Design ................................................................................. 21
2.5. Capabilities Required by M odular Design.................................................................... 23
2.6. M odular Production and Usage ................................................................................... 26
2.7. Definition of Openness.................................................................................................. 28
3. Role of Product Architecture in the Firm ...................... ....... ...................... 29
3.1. Co-evolution of Product and Enterprise Architectures ................................................ 29
3.2. Added Value Analysis................................................................................................... 31
3.3. Architectural Change and Com petitive Advantage....................................................... 33
3.4. Cognition of Shifting Competitive Contexts................................................................. 41
4. DoD's M OSA Procurement Strategy:..................... ........................................ ...................... 44
4.1. Objectives....................................................................................................................... 44
4.2. Required custom er capabilities ................................................................................... 46
4.3. Disruptive Nature of M OSA ....................................................................................... 47
4.4. Case - M odularization of Airborne Radar .................................................................. 48
5. Avoiding Architectural Disruption..................................................................................................... 54
5.1. Characterizing the Threat .............................................................................................. 54
5.2. Products Likely Affected .............................................................................................. 56
5.3. Eroding Foundations of Competitive Advantage.......................................................... 57
5.4. Signals of Change........................................................................................................... 59
5.5. Organizational Anchors................................................................................................. 59
5.6. Effective Strategy Form ation........................................................................................ 61
5.7. Key Takeaways .............................................................................................................. 69
6. Bibliography........................ ....................................................................................................... 70

Table of Figures
Figure 1: Cost and Schedule Growth of Selected DoD Programs................................................ 9
Figure 2: Trailer Exhibiting Modular Architecture - Source: Ulrich, 1995 ............................... 13
Figure 3: Trailer Exhibiting Integral Architecture - Source: Ulrich, 1995 ................................ 14
Figure 4: Coupled Vs De-Coupled Interfaces (Ulrich, 1995)..................................................... 14
Figure 5: Characterization of Product Architectures .................................................................. 15
Figure 6: Partitioning of Design Information (Caliss, Baldwin and Clark, 2003)...................... 16
Figure 7: Design Structure Matrix - Integral Product Architecture - Source: Carliss, Baldwin,
C lark 2 0 0 3 ..................................................................................................................................... 17
Figure 8: DSM Modularization Through Partitioning - Source: Carliss, Baldwin, Clark 2003. 17
Figure 9: Tenets of Modular Design - Source: Flowers K, Azani C, 2004................................ 18
Figure 10: Introduction of an Interface Increasing System Complexity..................................... 20
Figure 11: Concurrent Design Enabled Through Modularization.............................................. 22
Figure 12: Reuse of Modules to Establish Product Platforms .................................................... 23
Figure 13: Preferred Standards - Source: Flowers, Azani 2004................................................. 28
Figure 14: Three Domains of Product Development Interactions - Source: Eppinger, S. 2001. 30
Figure 15: Eight Views of Organizational Design - Source: D. Nightingale and D.H. Rhodes,
2 0 0 8 ............................................................................................................................................... 3 1
Figure 16: Porter's Five Forces Fram ework.............................................................................. 32
Figure 17: Sam ple V alue Chain.................................................................................................. 32
Figure 18: Creating and Capturing the Pie ................................................................................. 32
Figure 19: IBM's Mainframe-Era Value Chain - Source: Fine, C 2004 .................................. 34
Figure 20: Vertical Industry Structure with Integrated Product - Source: Fine C., 2004............ 36
Figure 21: IBM's PC-era Value Chain- Source: Fine, C 2004................................................... 38
Figure 22: Internal Consistency of Dell's Organizational Design.............................................. 39
Figure 23: Horizontal Industry Structure with Modular Product - Source: Fine C., 2004 .......... 40
Figure 24: Product Complexity, Architectural Coupling, and Intellectual Property Provide
A erospace Strong V alue Chain Control........................................................................................ 45
Figure 25: Mechanically Scanned Radar Architecture - Stimson, G. 1998................................ 48
Figure 26: APG-76 Mechanically Scanned Fire Control Radar - Source: Stimson, G. 1998..... 50
Figure 27: F/A-22 AN/APG-77 Multi-function AESA - Source: NorthropGrumman.com....... 51
Figure 28: Optimal System Architectures Determined by Customer Values ............................. 54
Figure 29: Slowing Architectural Innovation Erodes Aerospace's Foundations of Competitive
A d v an tag e ..................................................................................................................................... 5 8
Figure 30: Constructive Leaning Loop of Capabilities - Source: Fine 2004 ............................. 63
This page has been intentionally left blank
-I-- -r- iT--ii -;- ----~r-~-. -- -- -: i-F ii i:- -llil~:~-*~--n;i~.~E"iiii=*~li'-
1. Introduction
1.1. U.S. Department of Defense Acquisition Program Performance
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is under greater pressure than ever to develop innovative
capabilities in response to rapidly changing threats. However, weapon system development
programs are taking 2-3 times longer than they were 30 years ago and extensive cost overruns
and delivery delays have become the norm rather than the exception. These advanced
technology development programs inherently involve substantial cost and schedule risk as the
scope of the effort required to develop these technologies is often unknown. The DoD and its
suppliers continuously attempt to identify and mitigate these risks. Yet many large acquisition
programs far exceed their initial budgets and schedules (Figure 1).
Scheduie DevelopaentCostGrowth I
(Month) (Prent)
Aerial Conmon Sensor 45 24 85
Future Contba System 48 48 78
Joint Strike Fihter 30 23 60
Expeditionary Fightin Vehicle 61 48 49
Figure 1: Cost and Schedule Growth of Selected DoD Programs.
(Pre-Milestone A and Early-Phase Systems Engineering, National Research Council, 2008)
The DoD spends billions of dollars every year on procuring equipment and research and
development services from the private sector. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) creates
a single framework by which the DoD manages procurement programs for everything from duct
tape to fighter jets. However, unlike duct tape, the government must develop and build fighter
jets itself since no commercial market exists. The DoD contracts private aerospace companies to
design, manufacture, and support such systems. While the Federal Acquisition Regulation's
successes are visible in technological achievements of systems such as the Global Positioning
System (GPS) and the F-22 Stealth Fighter, its ability to rapidly and affordably deliver the new
warfighting capabilities the DoD requires is being called into question.
The FAR relies heavily on inter-supplier competition to maximize the DoD's purchasing power
and incentivize desired contractor behavior. However, recent defense industry consolidation has
weakened the DoD's negotiating position. Boeing now includes former industry members
Rockwell International Aerospace, McDonnell-Douglas Aerospace, Hughes Helicopters, and
Litton Precision Gear and is the only major American airliner manufacturer. Industry
consolidation is at least as great around the other three prime contractors; Lockheed Martin,
Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman. Consolidation has enabled these prime contractors to
diversify and better adapt to the volatility induced by changes in defense spending. However,
this reduction in sources of supply for its technology needs has served to reduce the DoD's
ability to apply competitive pressure to the procurement process. While the effect of this
consolidation on acquisition program performance is debatable, the DoD perceives that it
diminishes its ability to affordably procure technology.
During the mid-20th century, the United States Department of Defense led the world in its ability
to develop cutting edge technology. Now the commercial sector is leading in development of
new technology and the present rate of innovation in the commercial sector often outstrips
improvements in DoD weapon systems. Due to the length of the procurement process and the
current rate of innovation, systems can become obsolete before they are fielded. The DoD
responded to this challenge by identifying methods for leveraging the competitive prices and
rapid innovation found in the commercial markets.
In the early 1990s the DoD mandated the use of COTS (Common Off The Shelf) parts whenever
possible. Increased use of technologies applicable to both the commercial and military sectors
allows the DoD to leverage the cost, performance, and quality benefits of commercial innovation
and economies of scale. Utilizing commercial equipment was hoped to enable the DoD to obtain
high quality, competitive prices, on-time delivery, and the latest technology with little or no
Government investment. However, mandating the use of COTS parts has not resulted in a
significant procurement performance improvement. Fighter planes and aircraft carriers are
large, complex, and highly integrated systems. Their closed integrated system architectures with
proprietary non-standardized interfaces leave few opportunities to leverage COTS equipment.
The DoD requires new system architectures that enable it to utilize the state-of-the-art
technology and competitive pricing found in commercial markets to improve acquisition
performance.
The ever-increasing scale, complexity, and required performance of these weapon systems are
driving much of the cost and schedule growth on development programs. For example, the
DoD's Net-centric effort to integrate every facet of warfighting into a cohesive force requires
more weapon systems to communicate and coordinate their activities with each other which
increases system complexity. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, currently in development, is an
enormously sophisticated aircraft that is required to be four times more effective than legacy
fighters in air-to-air combat and eight times more effective in air-to-ground combat. The F-35
will soon be the world's most technologically advanced fighter. At the same time, the F-35 is
expected to improve on affordability and maintainability over previous fighter generations. The
scale and complexity of these systems are amplifying the effort required to mitigate technology
challenges as they arise in the development process. The budgets and schedules of their
development programs will continue to climb unless the government and Aerospace can better
manage system complexity.
1.2. Modular Open System Architecture Requirements
In order to effectively improve the performance of the FAR procurement process, the DoD
required an innovative approach to inject additional competitive pressure into the procurement
process, reduce design complexity, create additional opportunities to leverage commercial
sources of innovation, and drive in economies of scale. In the early 1990s, the computer industry
and the Internet provided the inspiration for such an approach. The modular architecture of the
personal computer was accelerating the rate of technology innovation and made computers
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increasingly affordable. The internet's open architecture created an information platform that
allowed PCs built by various manufacturers to communicate across the world. These lessons
helped the Department of Defense to recognize the interdependency between its product
architectures and its procurement capabilities. In response the DoD created Modular Open
System Architectures (MOSA) requirements, an architectural strategy that exploits the concepts
of Modularity and Openness to improve acquisition program performance. The goals of MOSA
are to:
* Rapidly and efficiently create new warfighting capabilities
* Provide access to world class design, production, operation and support capabilities
* Inject additional competitive pressure into the procurement process
In November 1994 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
Paul G Kaminski, established the Open Systems Joint Task Force (OSJTF) to "sponsor and
accelerate the adoption of open systems in electronics included in weapons systems
acquisitions." The goals of the OSJTF were to:
* Make MOSA an integral part of the acquisition process
* Provide expert assistance in applying MOSA
* Ensure application of MOSA by all acquisition programs
* Collaborate with industry to ensure a viable open standards base
As directed, the OSJTF established a policy for modular open systems in weapon system
acquisition. In May of 2003 this policy was then incorporated in DoD Directive 5000.1, "The
Defense Acquisition System," and into DoD Instruction 5000.2, "Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System." Additionally, in September 2004, the Open Systems Joint Task Force
published the program manager's guide "A Modular Open Systems Approach to Acquisition" to
facilitate the cultural adoption of MOSA and enforcement of their specifications. As of October
2004, all DoD acquisition programs are now subject to a milestone review and must brief their
program's MOSA implementation status to the Milestone Decision Authority for OSJTF's
MOSA policy compliance.
It took several additional years for the MOSA policy to be adopted by the acquisition community
and Aerospace industry and only recently have acquisition programs included strong contract
language requiring MOSA compliant system designs. These are large mature organizations and
it will take time to completely socialize and integrate MOSA into the procurement cycle. As
acquisition programs can last for years or even decades, it will take even longer to evaluate if the
promised MOSA benefits materialize. However, the impact of the OSJTF's MOSA policy on the
Aerospace industry's competitive context is already becoming apparent. Defense contractors are
advertising fully MOSA compliant systems as a source of competitive advantage versus
competitors with closed and integrated system architectures. The DoD is leveraging MOSA to
inject additional competitive pressure even after contract award. Modular Open System
Architecture is demonstrating a potential to significantly disrupt the business models and
competitive context of the Aerospace contractor industry.
1.3. Thesis Structure
The objective of this thesis is to define the disruptive potential of the DoD's MOSA procurement
strategy for the U.S. Aerospace industry. This will be accomplished by:
* Defining modularity and openness
* Examining the connection between product and enterprise architectures
* Presenting relevant historical examples of disruption
* Providing a framework for characterizing the impact of MOSA on the competitive context
* Suggesting strategies that may be effective in competing in a MOSA procurement
environment
MOSA has the potential to be extremely disruptive to the industry in some product lines. MOSA
is a subtle shift in the competitive context for Aerospace firms. This subtlety combined with
Aerospace's organizational complexity and causal ambiguity will make it extremely difficult for
these firms to avoid disruption. Hopefully, this thesis will help Aerospace to begin the
organizational transformations required to effectively compete in this new era. The key ideas
that the reader should take away are:
1. MOSA is NOT just new technical requirements, it is an embodiment of changing customer
values and new procurement capabilities
2. Aerospace should anticipate a change in ways in which their customers value, purchase, and
use their products
3. Contractors that deliver the specialized capabilities desired by its customers will capture
greater value from programs
4. Organizational beliefs will determine Aerospace's ability to effectively respond to MOSA
2. Modular and Open Product Architectures
2.1. Definition of Modularity
To identify the possible implications of MOSA on the defense contractor business model, it is
important to understand what modular product architectures are and are used for. Modularity is a
characteristic of a product's architecture, or the allocation of its functionality to its physical
components. Product architecture is defined by (Ulrich, 1995):
* The arrangement of functional elements
* The mapping from functional elements to physical components
* The specification of the interfaces between these physical components.
A product's architecture can have an enormous impact on the performance of the design process,
product, and firm. The product's architecture can determine what skills are required to contribute
to the design, how flexible the product is in adapting to changes in technology and user's needs,
and how easy it is to manufacture. Modularization of a product's architecture is often used as a
strategy for mitigating complexity and providing process, product, and firm flexibility by
minimizing the cost and complexity of product changes.
Modular architectures minimize the cost of change by localizing the effects of design changes to
as few product components as possible. Modular architectures are arranged into modules, which
are groupings of system components that are strongly related in function and weakly related to
other components. The degree to which functionality can be allocated to single components
determines the relative modularity of the system. Truly modular designs have a one-to-one
mapping of functions to modules. The functional mapping of the trailer in the following figure
demonstrates such one-to-one mapping between modules and their functions.
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Figure 2: Trailer Exhibiting Modular Architecture - Source: Ulrich, 1995
This one-to-one mapping of function to physical modules enables flexibility of the product's
functionality by minimizing the complexity and cost of design changes. If the designer wished
to change how the trailer connected to the towing vehicle, this change would likely only impact
the hitch and leave the remaining modules unchanged. Modular architectures are contrasted by
integral architectures that have non one-to-one mappings of functions to physical modules. The
following figure demonstrates integral architecture.
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Figure 3: Trailer Exhibiting Integral Architecture - Source: Ulrich, 1995
If our designer wished to change how this trailer connected to the towing vehicle, the change
would only impact the nose piece. However, the nose piece in this architecture is also
responsible for both minimizing air drag and supporting the cargo loads. This design change is
significantly more complicated in the integral architecture since we must now ensure that the
nose piece still adequately performed these functions after changing the hitch. This increased
complexity may require additionally skilled labor, time, or manpower to complete the design
change.
Modular design's one-to-one mapping of functions to modules is a powerful method for
facilitating changes through the minimization of change complexity. However, to ensure that the
impact of a design change is localized to a single module, modular designs also employ de-
coupled interfaces. Two modules are said to be coupled if a change made to one component
requires a change to the other component in order for the overall product to work correctly. The
following figure demonstrates the difference between coupled and de-coupled interfaces.
fl\* .-TF% Box
De-coupled Interface Coupled Interface
Figure 4: Coupled Vs De-Coupled Interfaces (Ulrich, 1995)
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If our trailer utilized the above coupled interface, any change to the trailer box design would
require consideration of the bed design. However, the modular trailer architecture with its de-
coupled interfaces allows changes in the box design with minimal consideration of the bed
design. De-coupling further minimizes the complexity of design change by ensuring change
localization.
In order to maximize the modular design benefits of change localization, system behaviors, such
as heat generation and vibration, should also have as close to a one-to-one mapping to physical
components as well. This behavioral allocation minimizes the complexity of behavior
management. Often design disciplines are strongly related to specific system behaviors, and a
one-to-one mapping between behaviors and modules enables modularization and specialization
of the design team. In this way, the various engineering -ilities can focus their attention on the
specific modules that impact their behavior of concern. For example, mechanical engineers can
be assigned to modules where heat and vibration management is important and electrical
engineers can be assigned to modules where managing electrical interference is critical.
Facilitating this skill specialization and limiting the quantity of architectural knowledge required
to effectively design a module is an important aspect to reducing the cost and complexity of
design change.
To ensure that unintended leakage of system behaviors between modules does not occur,
management of inter-module interactions is critical. Ideally, modular architectures limit
interactions between modules to predefined module interfaces. Additionally, only predefined
interactions occur at these interfaces. Through effective functional and behavioral management,
the architect can modularize both the system's physical components and the design information.
The ability of architects to identify and manage functional and behavioral coupling between
modules will ultimately determine their ability to mitigate complexity in the design and improve
the effectiveness of the design process.
Modular Integral
Arrangement of functional elements Modules Chunks
Mapping from functional elements to physical components One-to-One One-to-Many
Specification of the interfaces De-coupled Coupled
Mapping of system behaviors to physical components One-to-One One-to-Many
Interactions between physical components Predefined Unknown
Location of interactions Interfaces Unknown
Figure 5: Characterization of Product Architectures
2.2. Modular Design Processes
As the modularization of a product's architecture can take significant time and effort, modularity
is an investment made by the firm to create flexibility of design, production, and use. However,
the return on the firm's investment will fail to materialize without proper planning and execution
of the design process. Modularity requires that the functions, behaviors, and performance
specifications are decomposed and allocated to as few modules as possible while utilizing
decoupled interfaces between these modules. To ensure that this decomposition and allocation
process results in effective modularization, a design specification allocation process advocated
by modularity experts Caliss, Baldwin and Clark, starts with a partitioning of all design
information into visible and hidden "Design Rules." Visible Design Rules define the modules,
the interfaces, and the tests that validate that a module conforms to the modularization strategy
and demonstrates the desired functionality and behavior. Hidden Design Rules covers all of the
various module design decisions that do not affect the system beyond individual modules.
Visible Design Rules
Hidden Design RulesArchitecture Interfaces Standards
What modules are ITesting a module's
How will modules conformity to thepart of the system Module specific designinteract, fit, connect, design rules and
and their functions information
communicate measuringare performance
Figure 6: Partitioning of Design Information (Caliss, Baldwin and Clark, 2003)
Managing these dependencies and creating an effective modularization strategy require an
abundance of product, firm, and environmental information to establish the "Design Rules" and
modularize successfully. Effectively partitioning the design information up-front is difficult
because architects often cannot completely define all of the design parameters of the system until
the system manufactured and fielded. The system level information required for modularization
strategy can include:
* Modularity-enabled design, production, and use capabilities desired
* Knowledge of all design, production, and use domains
* Ability to validate the functionality and behavior of designs before production
* Complete understanding of product / environmental interactions
Design Structure Matrices (DSM) is one of many tools that architects often utilize to map design
parameters and their dependencies. Design parameters of the modules are itemized along the
rows and columns of the matrix. Interactions between design parameters are then marked. The
following figures demonstrate the effective partitioning of design information between design
teams and physical modules.
Design
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Figure 7: Design Structure Matrix - Integral Product Architecture - Source: Carliss, Baldwin, Clark 2003
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Notice that after partitioning the design parameters, the Design Rules Task Group controls a sub-
set of the design specifications for all modules and that the specifications that are not under its
control are "hidden" within one module. This partitioning of information creates the Visible and
Hidden design rules required for effective modularization. The complexity of design decisions is
significantly reduced and the various design teams are now able to work independently and in
parallel.
Design dependencies are not limited to product parameters and can often arise from the
production, business, or environment domains. There are also often physical and legal reasons
for design dependencies. DSMs that map design parameters to people, manufacturing
equipment, or other resources are useful tools for identification of design dependencies arising
from domains other than engineering. These dependencies can change with the emergence of
new designs, manufacturing processes, and technology. Continuous identification of hidden
dependencies is a required organizational capability if the modularization strategy is to be
successful.
The tenants of modular design serve as a useful framework for guiding the identification and
design of modules (Flowers K, Azani C, 2004). Under this framework, a design is said to be
truly modular if its modules demonstrate cohesiveness, are well encapsulated, are self-contained,
and are highly binded.
i,,
Figure 9: Tenets of Modular Design - Source: Flowers K, Azani C, 2004
A module is defined to be highly cohesive if all of the functionality assigned to it is strongly
related. For example, a monitor that was intended to both display visual information and project
sound would demonstrate low cohesion since these functionalities are not strongly related. A
module would be described as well encapsulated if it hides the internal workings of the module
from the rest of the system. A PC's hard drive is a well encapsulated module since a change in
data storage technology does not impact the rest of the system. System modules are defined to
be self-contained if they do not constrain the design or performance of other modules. If our
hard drive required so much system power that it affected the remaining design of the system,
then its design is not well contained. To enable the goals of commonality and reuse, each of the
modules must be highly binded, meaning that the modules uses broad and general definitions of
__I_
functionality. For example, if we were to define many categories of hard drives each with their
own specialized functionality and interfaces, the selection of drives we could use for our desktop
computer would narrow to drives that met our particular system function and performance needs.
Adherence to these tenants of modularity will minimize unintended module interaction,
maximize product flexibility and mitigate design complexity.
As design dependencies and design requirements change over the course of the design process, it
is important to continually assess the success of the modularization strategy. The first step is to
verify that all of the important design parameters (requirements, functions, behaviors, and
interfaces) have been accounted for and allocated to the system. Additionally, compile a list of
all the desired capabilities that are created through modularity of design, production, and use.
For example, modules intended for outsourcing should be divided from the rest of the design
effort to as great an extent as possible. Any remaining visible parameters allocated to the
outsourced module should be stable and closely managed parameters to minimize the interaction
required between the module and the internal system design teams. The degree to which the
parameter allocation creates the desired design capabilities dictates the success of the
modularization strategy.
The explicit management of interfaces and standards is extremely important during the design of
modular products if the modularity-enabled benefits of complexity mitigation and flexibility are
to be conferred to the design team. Stable decoupled interfaces and standards are important to
minimizing the amount of system-level knowledge required of module designers as they
eliminate the impacts of external design changes. Managing interfaces and standards is also
important when interoperability, extensibility, reusability, or maintainability is key product
requirements as they facilitate compatibility with externally sourced modules and third party
support of the system.
2.3. Limitations of Modularization in Practice
Modular product architectures potentially create enormous value for both the design firm and the
customer. However, there are several limitations on the architect's ability to modularize a
system in practice.
* Systems have interactions that are beyond control of the designer
* Functional performance is determined by multiple modules (weight, power, size, etc)
* Limitations of design tools to model interactions and validate system modularity
* Cost of interfaces on design complexity
* Cost of interfaces on system level performance
* Constraints of modularity on performance optimization
* Hidden system integrality
Systems often exhibit inherent integrality and have functional or behavioral interactions that are
beyond the control of the architect. System level performance attributes, such as the acceleration
of a car, are typically determined by modular attributes such as mass and size. Every
component of a car will contribute to its ability to accelerate and will prevent the architect from
mapping this function to a single module.
The architect's ability to decompose a system into modules can also be limited by the capability
of design tools available. Many physical processes and system behaviors currently cannot be
modeled or decomposed well. Designs in high-power applications, such as the design of jet
engines, where large quantities of heat and force are present are particularly difficult validate
through modeling. These forces cannot be isolated to one module and the behavior of the
module cannot be decoupled from other interfacing modules. Often the modules must be
designed and manufactured, then validated physically when they are integrated with other
components. The system design and interfaces must then be tailored to the behavior exhibited by
the integrated system. The ability of the architect to model and validate system-level
performance prevents modularization of the design.
In an effort to modularize a system and allocate single functions to modules, the architect can
introduce interfaces where they are not required by the system. Functional decomposition and
the addition of interfaces can increase the actual complexity above the essential complexity of
the system. The following figure demonstrates an increase in system complexity from the
introduction of an interface that raises the number of component connections from six to eight.
Integrated Modular
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Figure 10: Introduction of an Interface Increasing System Complexity
While modularization can provide many benefits to the firm and customer, it often incurs a cost.
Each additional interface can incur a performance penalty on the product and the design process.
The effort required to manage interfaces increases with each additional interface. Additionally,
these interfaces can incur a penalty to system-level performance. In an effort to minimize
module interactions with decoupled interfaces, systems can quickly become "boxes of boxes."
In physical systems, each additional box can add mass, surface area, or cost which become
penalties to overall system performance.
The required level of system performance can also limit the architect's ability to modularize the
system as opportunities for performance optimization often exist between the design options
presented by the modular architecture. This trade between modularity and system performance
can be seen in the evolution of the personal computer. Modularity has facilitated the rapid
incremental innovation of the CPU. However, the traditional modular architecture of the PC is
increasingly unable to mitigate the additional heat generated by exponentially growing number
of transistors inside the CPU. The need to continually improve performance is driving the
industry towards ever increasingly integrated system architectures with advanced heat dissipation
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technologies. In fact, Intel's ability to deliver integrated CPU and motherboard designs that
effectively managed heat was a major factor in Apple's decision to move from IBM to Intel's
computing platform.
Note that many system architectures, such as the PC, may appear modular in the design domain,
but in reality are not. Architectural dependencies arise from domains beyond the purely
technical. Monetary, regulatory, and intellectual property rights often result in unplanned
coupling between modules. For example, the use of a hazardous material may require
specialized manufacturing processes or facilities that could limit the design options available to
the rest of the system. Integrality can even be hidden by the design process itself. Designers
often mitigate module interactions on the fly without formal dependency management. For
example, reliability specialists routinely mitigate difficult to isolate system behaviors such as
vibration, heat, and power through overdesign of the module components which hides the
inherent integrality of the design from the rest of the system. Without effective dependency
mitigation capabilities, the firm will be unable to execute its modularization strategy.
2.4. Firm Benefits of Modular Design
Modularization is an investment by the firm in flexibility and the reduction of complexity. It
creates numerous product, organizational, and customer capabilities through the minimization of
the cost and complexity of change. These capabilities result in numerous benefits to the firm
which includes:
Mitigation of design complexity:
* Reduction in design scope
* Skill specialization
* Enablement of concurrent engineering
* Rapid experimentation / product improvement
* Reduced cost of change
* Accommodation of future uncertainty
* Reduction of design risk
Establishment of Product Platforms:
* Facilitates reuse
* Accelerates time to market
* Reduces development costs
* Flexibility in application and function
Many of modularization's benefits result from the reduction in design complexity. The
modularization Design Rules (product architecture, interfaces, and standards) captures much of
the system's architectural information. These Design Rules greatly reduce the complexity of the
system for designers as a much smaller scope of system knowledge is required to effectively
contribute to the system. This reduction in scope allows a module design team to specialize in
the engineering disciplines, technologies, and processes specifically required to realize a single
module. Skill specialization can result in improved design process effectiveness and product
innovation. Modularization of the product architecture and design information also greatly
simplifies the interaction between module design teams. If the product is truly modular each
team can proceed concurrently and the design team itself can modularize and design each
module concurrently, rather than in series. Concurrent design processes can result in accelerated
design schedules and budgets.
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Figure 11: Concurrent Design Enabled Through Modularization
All technology development involves some level of design risk. As the design process proceeds
and problems with the design materialize necessitating a change in the product, modular
architectures limit the scope of their impact. This ability to accommodate change makes
modular design extremely attractive in industries or technologies with high levels of uncertainty.
Market conditions can change and technologies can be difficult to master. Modular product
architectures provide the firm an ability to adapt as conditions change or problems arise in a
design process. Modularization's reduction in design complexity promises an enormous
improvement in product, process, and organizational effectiveness.
The design process is an investment by the firm in to develop a product that creates customer
value by meeting a specific customer need. Modularity can reduce the size of this investment in
product realization by reducing the cost and schedule of the design process. However,
modularity's greatest improvement of the firm's return on investment is not reduced cost in
meeting this specific customer need, but the creation of other attractive real options (Carliss,
Baldwin, and Clark, 2003). Modularity facilitates design reuse and minimizes the cost of design
change, which enables the establishment of product platforms. Product platforms are reusable
module designs that can meet the needs of multiple customer groups.
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Figure 12: Reuse of Modules to Establish Product Platforms
For example, Ford may utilize the same modular drive train in several automobiles which are
targeted towards distinct customer segments. The use of common design platforms reduces the
design cost and time to market for products that utilize the product platform. As long as
customer and firm requirements stay within the real options presented by the product platform,
modular architectures facilitate rapid response to a larger variety of customer needs.
2.5. Capabilities Required by Modular Design
In order to successfully create a modular architecture and leverage product platforms, several
organizational capabilities are required:
* Creating effective modularization strategies
* Continuous management of the modularization Design Rules
* Leadership with greater depth of architectural knowledge
* Identification of the driving forces of integrality
* Architecture validation and performance evaluation
* Interface management
Modularization of a product's architecture alone will not guarantee to facilitate all of the
potential modularity-enabled benefits. These benefits must be specified as requirements early in
conceptual design to ensure that the process and organization also support their realization. For
example, enabling concurrent design requires both modular product architecture and an
organizational ability to split design resources, such as personnel or test equipment. The ability
to articulate how product modularity will be leveraged and define program management
strategies to realize these goals are required capabilities before modularization can benefit the
firm.
The establishment and management of modularization Design Rules is an essential
organizational capability that is typically poorly implemented. Often, modularity is added to the
design process as simply another design requirement and the design process is expected to
proceed as any other project. However, the benefits of modular design do not come without
significant investment by the firm. Effective product modularization requires a completely new
approach to early stages of the design process. Collecting all of the required design information
and establishing the modularization plan can significantly increase the level of effort required in
conceptual design. New design process, information systems, and patterns of communication
must be developed in order to successfully create modular architectures and leverage product
platforms.
Very different design management capabilities are required to manage the design of integral
product as compared to modular products. Integral products are comprised of chunks, rather
than modules, which can have several visible and hidden dependencies between chunks.
Additionally, the allocation of system functions and behaviors can be spread across several
chunks. In integral product design, very high level system requirements are flowed down to
chunk design teams who are required to manage these interactions between their individual
chunks, the rest of the system, and its operating environment. Chunk design teams are required
to be multi-disciplinary in order to identify and manage all of the unidentified design
dependencies from the various domains. As the design process progresses, chunk design teams
engage in frequent unstructured design dialogue to resolve undesired system behaviors or chunk
interactions and monitor system-level performance. Design leadership plays a system integrator
role by facilitating this unstructured interaction between teams. Additionally, since design of
chunks is inherently complex, design leadership for integral products specialize in mitigating
complexity from other non-design domains, such as organizational and processes. Therefore,
integral product leadership tends to be of managerial backgrounds rather than design experts.
Modular product leadership tends to require much greater product knowledge depth from
program management, especially at the early stages of design. Leadership of modular design
teams must facilitate the establishment of the modularization strategy and Design Rules which
can require an enormous quantity of architectural knowledge. As the design organization of
modular products tend to modularize around architectural lines, these module design teams
interact infrequently and with highly structured dialogue. This reduces the need for leadership to
facilitate design team communication.
However, it is unlikely that all architectural dependencies were identified during conceptual
design. Many architectural dependencies such as mechanical and power connections are obvious
and immediately visible to even the casual observer. Many system behaviors, such as
aerodynamic properties, electromagnetic radiation, and vibration, are very difficult to identify
and to manage. Unfortunately, these system behaviors are often key system properties for
Aerospace products. After the establishment of the Design Rules, it becomes the leadership's
responsibility to continually identify these hidden dependencies and revalidate the Design Rules
as the design matures and additional system knowledge becomes available. Therefore leadership
plays a system architect role when designing modular products which requires a much greater
depth of knowledge in the design, production, and customer domains. Having the appropriate
leadership is crucial to developing the capabilities required by modular design.
Often in mature product industries, existing integral product architectures are "modularized"
without significant investment in articulating the forces driving toward integrality or
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identification of design dependencies in an effort to quickly leverage the promised benefits of
modularization. Such "paper-modularization" may not initially adversely affect the design
process since the integrative capability of the organization will mitigate hidden design
dependencies as they arise. However, leveraging the modularity enabled capabilities, such as
design reuse or concurrent design, will be difficult. Reusing a module that had hidden design
dependencies will require much greater effort to integrate with any system that it was not
specifically designed for. It will be especially difficult for any other firm to integrate the module
into their products as it would likely lack the integrative capability of the original design team
and the architectural knowledge required.
When transitioning from integral to modular product architectures, it is important that the
organization identify its hidden dependency management capabilities. All of the tacit knowledge
(skills, processes, communication patterns, etc) that allow it to successfully mitigate unwanted
design behavior must be converted to explicit knowledge for inclusion in the Design Rules.
Successful conversion is unlikely to occur on the first attempt at modularization. Often, all of
the design parameters will not be available until the first couple generations of modular products
are manufactured, fielded, and retired. Therefore, collecting this design data as it becomes
available and providing it to successive system architects to achieve a truly modular architecture
is important. New organizational skills, processes, and communication patterns will be required
to amass this design information.
The Design Rules serve as litmus test for module designers. As long as their module designs
conform to the Design Rules, then it should demonstrate the required functionality and behavior
when integrated with the system. In order to provide this guarantee, the organization must have
the capability to validate functional performance and behavior of conceptual system
architectures. Validation of the Design Rules can come through computer models or designer
experience, but it must occur before a modularization strategy is accepted. Additionally, once
the Design Rules are established and the design process begun, the organization must have the
capability to verify module conformance to the defined standards. New test equipment,
processes, and personnel may be required to verify Design Rules conformance. Without this
capability the firm will be unable to successfully leverage modular design.
Design firms are typically defined by what they design. Essentially, "you are what you build."
The skills, technologies, resources, and processes required to develop technology is acquired
through the development process. The organizational capability of product delivery is improved
with every product generation, effectively creating design economies of scale. Modular
architectures can provide much greater access to technologies and products created around the
world. Often it is more financially attractive for a design team to outsource a module rather than
design and produce it internally. However, this outsourcing decision can present a trade between
the short-run value of reduced product cost and the long-run implications of reduced
organizational capability in delivering that particular product.
The strategic sourcing of module design and production can have serious implications for the
future performance of the firm, especially when reuse or establishment of product platforms is
desired. Outsourcing could be damaging if the firm wishes to compete in this product space in
the future. Winner and losers are created quickly in industries based on modular products.
Christenson has demonstrated how can difficult it is to establish global leadership in modular
competition (Christenson, 2003). Outsourcing critical modules could mean the difference
between down and out of the game. As Fine has indicated, strategic sourcing and value chain
design could be the ultimate organizational core competency and source of competitive
advantage (Fine, 1998).
Organizations that utilize integral architectures often have multiple interface designs, even within
successive generations of the same product. Interfaces can often become system performance
constraints. If interface standardization does not create organizational value through the
enablement of design reuse or concurrent design, redesigning interfaces become attractive
opportunities for maximizing system performance. Therefore, organizations that build integral
product architectures rarely develop effective interface management capabilities.
However, the ability of the firm to leverage many of the benefits of modular design is dependent
on effective interface management. A product's interfaces become more than a physical method
inter-module communication within the design firm. Product interfaces structure dialogue
between design teams, affects the architect's ability to leverage internal and external sources of
technology, and determines the number of participants in the value chain. Effective management
of interfaces requires several organizational capabilities. The firm must be able to standardize
internal product interfaces to maximize the opportunities of design reuse and facilitate the
decoupling of design efforts. It must specify stable product interfaces for suppliers to minimize
complexity of the design process. Additionally, it must maintain control of its interfaces in the
marketplace through participation in industry standards bodies or fighting standards wars with
competitors. All of these capabilities require recognition of the value of interfaces to the firm
and an investment in managing and protecting these interfaces.
2.6. Modular Production and Usage
Many of the benefits of modularity are found outside design process improvement. Modular
product architectures also facilitate modular production and modular use. Modular production
leverages the modularity of the product to provide the firm access to additional sources of scale
and scope and reduce production complexity. For example, the modularity of modern commuter
planes enables Boeing to centralize production of components, such as wings, within one facility
and capture economies of scale and quality improvements. Modularity also allows Boeing to
gain access to world class capabilities that exist outside the firm. Standardization and well-
managed interfaces allow Boeing to utilize jet engines from General Electric that are more
affordable and reliable than it could produce itself.
Benefits of Modular Production
* Economies of scale
* Economies of scope
* Reduced complexity
* Reduced integration and test effort
Effectively leveraging modular production requires several organizational capabilities.
Outsourcing production without adequate modularization of the product can lead to disaster
when the various components are eventually integrated together. The time and expense of
integrating a complex product could outweigh the scale benefits of outsourced production.
Strategic sourcing is also a key competency required in firms that wish to utilize modular
production. The scope of the firm is a decision that should be made with more considerations
than short term cost savings. Outsourcing reduces the firm's ability to create internal scale and
obtain valuable product insight that could lead to future product improvements. Sourcing
decisions should support the firm's long run strategic vision. Modular production can also
require additional coordination and communication capabilities as manufacturing is
decentralized or outsourced to ensure final production schedules and budgets are met.
Additionally, firms require the legal rights to decentralize production. For example, AMD's x86
license contract with Intel does not allow them to export designs to other firms to manufacture,
limiting their ability to match Intel's scale advantage.
Capabilities required by modular production
* Modular product architecture
* Strategic sourcing
* Additional coordination and communication
* Legal rights
Modular usage is typically what consumers refer to as product modularity. Modular products,
such as computers, are user customizable and facilitate incremental upgrades or changes in
configuration as needs evolve. The decoupled interfaces and standardization of battery design
allow consumers to replace batteries in their electronic devices from their supplier of choice with
little consideration of performance or compatibility.
Benefits of modular usage
* User customizable
* Ease of maintenance
* Incremental upgrades
Modularity of use will fail to be realized if the consumer lacks the physical ability, legal right, or
knowledge required to alter the system configuration. For example, automobiles have highly
modular architectures. However, few users have the capability or equipment required to replace
an alternator or a transmission themselves.
Required capabilities for modular usage
* Legal and physical capability
* Appropriate system knowledge
2.7. Definition of Openness
Open architectures are characterized by their use of stable, widely-accepted, and non-proprietary
interfaces and standards. Open architectures creates an enabling environment that provides 
the
designer and customer access to the greatest number of design, production, and 
usage
capabilities. The relative openness of interfaces and standards is determined by the 
degree to
which they are available and utilized by all relevant developers. The ultimate test of 
product
openness is: "Can a third party developer replace a system component using only 
openly
published and available technical specifications of the component?"
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Figure 13: Preferred Standards - Source: Flowers, Azani 2004
3. Role of Product Architecture in the Firm
3.1. Co-evolution of Product and Enterprise Architectures
Enterprises are complex and dynamic systems that evolve over time as they try to align their
strategy with the competitive context and the real options presented by the product. Enterprises
consist of a dense and dynamic web of information, money, and resources between the various
elements of the enterprise. This architecture lays the foundation upon which organizational
capabilities and core competencies are based. The interactions between the products, processes,
and organization are often the most direct and visible and present many of the opportunities for
improving firm performance. We can analyze enterprise architectures with the same framework
we used to characterize product architectures:
Physical Decomposition
* Product - sub-systems, sub-assemblies, and components
* Process - sub-processes, tasks, activities, and work units
* Organization - teams and individuals
Interfaces
* Product - patterns of interactions between components
* Process - information exchanges across the tasks in order to execute a task
* Organization - communication patterns and the chain of command
As shown in the previous chapter, Design Structure Matricies (DMSs) are used by system
architects to mapping the product's physical decomposition and interfaces to identify hidden
design dependencies between product modules. Eppinger, Sosa, and Rowles (2001) extended
the use of DSMs to track the co-evolution of products, processes, and organizational designs and
identify "misalignment" between product and enterprise architectures. They defined how new
processes, product architectures, and organizational designs are created as:
1. Deficiencies are identified in the firm's ability to execute the development process and
realize the product.
2. Architectural change in the product enabled new organizational forms and behaviors
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Many firms utilize product and enterprise architectural alignment to create superior
organizational capabilities. Intel recognized the interdependency between manufacturing process
interactions and the communication patterns of its process engineers. It famously organized the
cubicles of these engineers to match the layout of the manufacturing floor to facilitate
communication that resulted in improvements in manufacturing efficiency.
Often organizational complexity prevents enterprise leadership from identifying opportunities to
achieve alignment and improve organizational capabilities. To facilitate alignment, Nightingale
and Rhodes have provided a structured and holistic approach to evaluating all the various
enterprise elements and their interactions. They note that interdependencies exist between the
product and almost every element of the organizational design. Management of these
interdependencies is becoming increasingly important as the growing complexity of technology
products is driving up organizational design complexity and obscuring opportunities to achieve
alignment.
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Figure 15: Eight Views of Organizational Design - Source: D. Nightingale and D.H. Rhodes, 2008
3.2. Added Value Analysis
As we have seen, enterprise architecture's co-evolve with its product's architecture and the
competitive context. Successfully aligning the enterprise and product architectures can lead to
superior operational capabilities in realizing products and services that create value for its
customers. However, how do firms capture this value? More specifically, what role do product
architectures play in maintaining firm profitability over the long run? In order to answer these
questions we will require a framework for evaluating the competitive advantage of firms.
Many frameworks for evaluating firm performance exist. Porter's Five Forces framework is
often used to examine the competitive dynamics within an industry and determine its
attractiveness.
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Figure 16: Porter's Five Forces Framework
However, Porter's approach provides us little guidance on evaluating the impact of evolving
product architectures and the capabilities they convey to and require of the firm. Therefore, we
shall utilize an added value approach to evaluating the effects of product architecture on firm
performance. Added value analysis seeks to answer the following questions:
1. Who are the relevant players?
2. What value is created by these players collectively?
3. Which players are capturing this value?
We shall utilize the concept of value chains to identify the relevant players. Every industry
participates in a value chain. Upstream are the suppliers that contribute to the inputs used by
members of the industry; product components, labor, raw materials, or capital. Downstream are
the consumers who purchase the products and services of firms in the industry. The value chain
is the entire network, from raw materials to final consumers, where each member contributes
some value to the chain.
Figure 17: Sample Value Chain
While every member of the chain contributes value to its inputs and this value is divided among
the participants in the chain, individual members are not guaranteed to capture any of their added
value. In order to explain firm performance, it is critical to identify both how value is created
and captured. A firm's value creation can be thought of as the difference between the customer's
Willingness-to-pay (WTP) for its products and the negotiated cost of its inputs.
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Figure 18: Creating and Capturing the Pie
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A firm's ability to both maximize the value it creates and extract this value from its value chain
is its competitive advantage. As the name implies, competitive advantage conveys advantage to
the firm over its rivals. Without competitive advantage, its suppliers and customers would find
another intermediary in the marketplace that would allow them to capture more of the value
created by the value chain. Sources of competitive advantage may be shared among firms, but
unique sources of competitive advantage are the most valuable.
There are two sources of competitive advantage; capabilities and positions. Firm capabilities are
its ability to create added value for the value chain. Examples of firm capabilities include
Toyota's low cost, high quality manufacturing capability and Apple's ability to design customer
pleasing consumer electronics. While these capabilities have been particularly difficult for their
competitors to replicate and have conveyed them a sustainable competitive advantage, not all
firm capabilities are sources of competitive advantage. Only capabilities that contribute to a
firm's ability to profit are sources of competitive advantage. Note that other firms might also
have similar capabilities and therefore conferring you no competitive advantage, commoditizing
your capabilities. In unrestricted competition between members of the industry, firm capabilities
and inter-firm negotiation would completely explain firm performance. As predicted in supply
and demand analysis, a zero profit condition would result if many homogeneous firms with
commoditized capabilities competed in perfectly competitive markets.
However, rarely are markets completely unrestricted. Typically there are frictions that constrain
interactions between participants in the value chain and allow some firms to capture more than
their added value even if their capabilities are not distinctive. Positions are these non-market
forces that restrict competition. Examples of firm positions include brands, laws, access to
unique assets, and geographic position. Note that many positions have significant first mover
advantages. However, these positions may be short lived as the rules of competition can change
and competitors look for ways to overtake these frictions. It is often unwise to entirely establish
a firm's strategy for sustainable competitive advantage on positions due to their fleeting nature.
3.3. Architectural Change and Competitive Advantage
In the previous sections, we have identified how product and enterprise architectures co-evolve
as:
1. Deficiencies are identified in the firm's ability to execute the development process and
realize the product
2. Architectural change in the product enabled new organizational forms and behaviors
The improvements in organizational capabilities and creation of new real options resulting from
changes in product architectures have significant impacts on a firm's ability to create sustainable
competitive advantage. This co-evolution of product architectures and the way firms compete
has been no more visible than in the evolution of information technology. We will utilize the
presented framework to evaluate the impact that evolving product architectures had on IBM, a
key player in IT.
Mainframe-Era IBM
During the mainframe era, IBM was the information technology industry. It essentially captured
all of the value created by IT at the time. IBM's value chain consisted primarily of small
subsystem and component suppliers and large institutional customers such as governments,
schools, and corporate IT departments. Due to the relative immaturity of computing technology
in this era, few organizations could articulate their individual computing needs. IBM technically
knowledgeable sales force would work with these customers in order to translate these needs into
technical requirements for its products. IBM then could match their customer's computing needs
with highly complex mainframes composed of components sourced from its many suppliers.
This customer and product complexity presented a significant barrier to entry to potential
competitors. Mainframes are large and highly complex systems. The architectural knowledge
required to design a mainframe's subsystem was enormous. Obtaining the required technical
capabilities and realizing the economies of learning required to competitively supply components
to IBM's customers was nearly impossible. IBM utilized a proprietary instruction set 
and
operating system and patented many of its interfaces creating legal barriers to market entry. IBM
was able to use modular mainframe components to create significant economies of scale in
production. Much of IBM's added value arose from its capabilities in managing complexity and
efficiency realizing the product.
IBM's success eventually made IBM synonymous with computers and "Big Blue" enjoyed
strong brand power amongst its customers. These capabilities and positions provided 
IBM
strong control of its value chain. IBM could compete suppliers of components amongst 
each
other, driving down its costs, and extract much of the value created by IT out of its customers.
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Figure 19: IBM's Mainframe-Era Value Chain - Source: Fine, C 2004
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Sources of IBM's Mainframe-era competitive advantage:
IBM's Capabilities:
* Understanding of a customer's specific computing requirements
* Ability to manage architectural complexity
* Product realization efficiency
* Integrative capabilities
* Relevant technology competencies
IBM's Positions:
* Brand
* Proprietary interfaces
* Strong relationships with customers with rich technical dialogue
The IBM 360
IBM designed the IBM 360 to deliver the affordability required to meet smaller markets that
were inaccessible with its large mainframe products. Mainframes components, while modular in
production, were only modular in use within one product line. The 360 was conceived as a
family of computers that were of different sizes suitable for different applications. 360s utilized
the same instruction set and standardized interfaces, meaning that programs and peripherals
developed for the 360 would be compatible for nearly every system configuration. The 360's
additional modularity in design, production, and usage created economies of scale and learning
and make computing much more affordable for a new market of customers.
In order to ensure that these modular production and usage capabilities were realized, IBM
modularized its design organization to match the product architecture of the 360 and highlight
potentially hidden dependencies between modules. It created a centralized design rules team that
developed the modularization strategy and decentralized development teams that were
responsible for each of the modules. This organizational design enabled IBM to identify hidden
design dependencies and create an effective modularization strategy. IBM organizational
strategy was essential in achieving its goals delivering modularity in design, production, and use
capabilities.
IBM successfully captured a large portion of this new market created by the IBM 360 for years.
However, the enormous size of IBM's value chain made it extremely attractive to its
competitors. The modular architecture of the IBM 360 enabled competitors to eventually reverse
engineer the 360's interfaces and offer plug-compatible components. Patenting the 360's
interfaces and threats of legal action were unable to deter competitors from picking pieces of the
value chain away from IBM. However, for the most part IBM was able to dominate the industry
with successive generations of the IBM 360 that were continuously one step ahead of the clone
makers in performance. The presence of these competitors, while extracting some value from
the 360, actually added enormous value to the platform by supplying additional complements
that provided IBM competitive advantage in competing with other mini-computer manufacturers.
The relationship IBM had with its customers was significantly altered by the modular
architecture of the IBM 360. The scalability of IBM 360 allowed many customers to match their
needs to a specific technical solution. Institutional IT departments could roughly estimate the
IBM 360 model that would meet their computing requirements and no longer required the
assistance that IBM's technically-oriented sales force could provide. While IBM maintained
strong relationships with the institutions it had worked with for years and continued to provide
the most demanding customers unique technical solutions, the rich technical exchange that
provided IBM such a strong competitive advantage began to fade.
Sources of IBM's competitive advantage:
IBM's Capabilities:
* Ability to manage architectural complexity
* Product realization efficiency
* Relevant technology competencies
IBM's Positions:
* Brand
* Proprietary interfaces
* Strong customer relationships
* Platform leader
IBM maintained an integrated vertical structure as product complexity, architectural coupling,
and Intellectual Property provided it strong sources of competitive advantage and value chain
control.
IT Industry Structure - IBM 360 era, 1975-85
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Figure 20: Vertical Industry Structure with Integrated Product - Source: Fine C., 2004
PC-era IBM
In 1982 millions of home computer models were being sold by firms such as Apple, Texas
Instruments, and Commodore, Atari. IBM feared that they were missing out on this exciting new
market segment and were losing relevance in the computer industry. In order to quickly
establish a leadership position in the already crowded home computer market, IBM created a
special team thousands of miles from its corporate headquarters with full authority to cut through
any organizational red tape that would hinder the delivery of the Personal Computer (PC). This
decision to free the design team from the needs of the enterprise had significant impacts on the
future of IBM.
The team's primary requirement for the architecture of the Personal Computer was the quick
delivery of an affordable and open platform that would be attractive to developers. Little
consideration was paid to how IBM would sustainably capture value from this platform. IBM's
ability to out-innovate its competitors and leverage its position at "Big Blue" enabled it to
dominate the industry in previous product generations and was assumed to continue into this new
era. Patenting the ROM BIOS was its only source of platform control the team installed in the
architecture of the PC. However, the team decided to publish the complete PC ROM BIOS in
IBM's technical reference manuals to aid application developers.
The team's focus on quick delivery and affordability meant that it made two decisions that had
drastic implications for the future of IBM. During negotiations with Microsoft on the licensing
terms for DOS, they allowed Microsoft to freely license it to competitors in exchange for a lower
flat rate for DOS. Microsoft was now strongly incentivized to facilitate not only IBM's market
success, but clone manufacturers as well.
IBM had the 801 processor available for the PC team. It was a powerful chip for its time and
had an advanced operating system already developed for it. However, the 801 would come with
organizational red tape which could slow the delivery schedule for the PC and limit the freedom
provided the team. So Intel's 8088 processor was selected for the PC even though it was
significantly less powerful than the 801. It was inexpensive, IBM already had a product based
upon the chip, and there was an existing developer community already familiar with the design.
The 8088 met the speed to market and affordability requirements of the design team. However,
this decision may have had a profoundly negative effect on the future of IBM.
Disruption of IBM
Facilitated by the availability of the ROM BIOS source code, many companies quickly went to
work reverse engineering the architecture of the PC and providing cloned products. A short ten
months after IBM launched the PC, Columbia Data Products had copied the design and was
selling PC-compatible machines. Many other manufacturers followed closely behind. IBM kept
improving the PC with larger storage capacities, faster processors from Intel, and updated
versions of DOS. However, each of these incremental improvements was available to and
quickly adopted by its competitors. It would improve the layout of components and introduce
new interfaces, but these were imitated or reverse engineered. While IBM developed a large
array of applications and peripherals for the PC, the market quickly became highly competitive
as an enormous industry of small suppliers with similar offerings sprung up around IBM.
IBM's brand, strong customer relationships, and a reputation as a leader in its industry initially
provided it a significant competitive advantage with its big institutional customers. Many
generations of IBM PCs were popular within these segments. However, as other clone
manufacturers established themselves in the market, these positions began to fade. The majority
of IT customers could meet all of their computing needs with the real options presented by the
PC, and few customers required unique computing solutions that warranted IBM's technical
expertise. The important performance and technical specifications for a PC could be
summarized on the side of a cardboard box of software. IBM's institutional customers could
identify exactly the computing hardware they needed without the help of IBM's sales force and
could compare IBM's products objectively with their competitors over a small and standardized
set of features. IBM lost the rich technical dialogue and close relationships that it once had with
its customers.
The way in which IT customers valued their PC suppliers changed as well. The performance and
capabilities of PCs quickly became commoditized. Maintaining compatibility with current and
future architectural standards became the driving incentive for customers which greatly slowed
architectural change. The small number of customer-valued performance specifications and the
universal availability of incremental improvements meant that PC suppliers were largely
competed on total cost of ownership alone. A supplier's ability to efficiently deliver the
customized IT solutions eventually became the only source of competitive advantage among PC
vendors. IBM's value chain and its customer-valued capabilities had changed significantly from
its mainframe-era:
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Figure 21: IBM's PC-era Value Chain- Source: Fine, C 2004
Sources of IBM's competitive advantage:
IBM's Capabilities:
* Product realization efficiency
IBM's control over the platform and the popularity of their products faded with every generation
of the PC. While IBM maintained significant technical expertise and market leadership in PC
components such as hard drives, its industry position was mostly of an integrator / OEM role.
Unfortunately, IBM lacked any distinctive low-cost manufacturing, delivery, and customer
support capabilities that would provide them competitive advantage in integration. IBM's
inability to create these organizational capabilities relegated it to ever-declining market shares as
a PC integrator.
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Firms like Dell sprung up to attack IBM head on. Dell created an entire organization oriented
towards delivering customized PC products quickly and cheaply. Dell's strategy was to
affordably deliver highly customized products to knowledgeable "have it your way" markets
such as corporate IT departments and discerning home users. By aligning the enterprise
architecture with this strategy, Dell developed "internal consistency" that allowed it to develop
distinctive manufacturing, delivery, and support, capabilities that provided it competitive
advantage as a system integrator.
"Have it your way markets" / Lean production
Web/ phone support i
UPS direct delivery
Make to order
JIT direct suppliers
Collocation of suppliers
Figure 22: Internal Consistency of Dell's Organizational Design
Microsoft and Intel held the only unique components that delivered value for the majority of PC
customers. After the release of the Intel 286 processor in 1986, Intel and Microsoft largely
controlled the PC architecture and captured a significant portion of the value from IT. While
many firms entered the industry with popular products and services that briefly established them
as a force in the industry, few firms other than Microsoft and Intel were able to create distinctive
positions and capabilities that have provided them sustainable competitive advantage in the PC
era. Intel's scale and scope advantages allowed it to heavily invest in R&D for its x86 line of
processors, leading to exponential improvements in speed and besting their competitors.
Microsoft, benefited by the network-effects of OS and file-type standards, has been able to
maintain its market dominance over other alternatives.
The industry rewarded firms, such as Dell, Intel, and Microsoft, as their specialized capabilities
or distinctive positions enabled them to capture their pieces of the IT value chain.
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Figure 23: Horizontal Industry Structure with Modular Product - Source: Fine C., 2004
Key Points
The advent of the Personal Computer, and its standardized, modular, and open architecture, led
to the erosion of IBM's competitive advantage over time and its eventual exit from consumer IT.
The architectural disruption of IBM has provided much insight to the interdependencies between
product architectures and organizational forms.
Key Points:
* Product architectures can have a profound effect on your customer supplier relationships and
can determine who captures the value created by your product
* Network effects of standardization limit the opportunities of firms to profit from architectural
innovation
* Large activity networks can commoditize even difficult to create knowledge assets
* Standardized modular and open product architectures enable suppliers and customers to meet
up in the marketplace without the architect. Inventing the platform is not enough to maintain
thought leadership within the industry and control of the platform
* Only firms with distinctive capabilities and positions created sustainable competitive
advantage. Few of these exist when standardization and openness make the related
capabilities available to all and minimize the opportunity to create positions.
* Large value chains with modular and open products enable and incentivize specialization
* Specialization in technological capabilities can greatly increase the rate of product
improvement
* Excellence in capabilities leads to value capture only when the additional performance is
valued by the customer
Microprocessors
Operating Systems
Peripherals
Applications Software
Network Services
Assembled Hardware
3.4. Cognition of Shifting Competitive Contexts
When faced with possibly disruptive changes in product architectures, it is imperative that the
firm have the following organizational capabilities in order to minimize the effects of disruption:
* Understanding of its value chain and its position within it
* Clear articulation of how the firm creates competitive advantage over its rivals
* Recognition of how a change in competitive context impacts the value chain and its ability to
create competitive advantage
* Definition of a successful strategy in this new competitive context
* Ability to align the firm with the strategy
Path dependencies often determine a firm's ability to identify, commit, and create the
organizational capabilities required to compete in a new competitive context. For example, firms
in industries that undergo high rates of change and are routinely faced with potentially disruptive
threats, such as technology-oriented firms, typically have strong organizational capabilities in
perceiving shifts in their competitive context and creating and implementing strategy.
However, path dependencies can have negative effects on successful firms in mature and stable
industries. As products and value chains stabilize, the competitive formula of a firm can become
embedded in the enterprise architecture of the firm. As a firm seeks to align its enterprise
architecture with its strategy for creating and capturing value, over time its competitive formula
can become embedded in everything from incentive structures and cultural beliefs to design
processes. Eventually the competitive formula can become so pervasive and unchanging that it
is no longer managed explicitly and is converted completely into tacit organizational knowledge.
Teece noted that mature firms in stable industries may eventually be unable to define how
exactly it is able to create the organizational capabilities that provide it competitive advantage.
This "causal ambiguity" can sometimes even serve as a source of competitive advantage as it
makes replication of these capabilities by potential competitors difficult.
While embedding the competitive formula in the organizational architecture may improve firm
performance during times of stability, these beliefs, information filters, processes, and
organizational designs may become "strategic straightjackets" when disruptive changes occurs.
If strategy and organizational design are not managed explicitly, it becomes exceedingly difficult
for a firm to identify when a change in strategy is required. Even if management recognized a
shift in the competitive context, an entrenched competitive formula creates organizational inertia
that can prevent management from aligning the firm with a new strategy.
The disruption of Polaroid is an excellent example of a successful firm that was disrupted by
organizational inertia. Despite early investment and leading-edge technical capability in areas
related to digital imaging, Polaroid could not survive in the digital photography era. Polaroid's
40 year history of effectively competing in the photography industry was embedded into the
beliefs of its management. These beliefs prevented Polaroid from identifying and creating the
required organizational capabilities when faced with disruptive product change.
Polaroid's Beliefs:
* Customers want instant physical prints with "photographic" quality
* Polaroid competes within the photography industry
* Polaroid is an innovator, not a "down and dirty" low cost manufacturer
* Products must sell consumables - razor / blade business model
* Successful products earn >65% profit margins
These beliefs combined with consistent film sales prevented Polaroid's management from taking
digital photograph seriously. They could not rationalize committing to digital photography when
their current film photography products offered improved image quality, instant physical prints,
and much higher profits than digital photography products. The beliefs and experience of
Polaroid's management prevented them from recognizing:
1. Possibility for rapid improvement in digital picture quality
2. Customer's value for eliminating consumables and the usage possibilities enabled by digital
photography
3. New customer markets available to digital photography products
While Polaroid Digital's PDC-2000 digital camera was developed and ready for release in 1992,
a combination of internal resistance and lack of commitment to this new market prevented the
PDC-2000's release until 1996. Even with its four year delay, the PDC-2000 was able to win
"Product of the Year" awards due to its sophisticated design. Polaroid clearly demonstrated a
leading-edge technological capability in digital photography. Unfortunately, its technology
competency was not enough to prevent Polaroid's demise.
Polaroid management's beliefs prevented it from identifying and creating the organizational
capabilities required competing in the digital photography market. The required technology
competencies were available in many other activity networks, such as the information
technology industry. Polaroid did not predict firms such Apple, Hewlett Packard, and Microsoft
would enter digital photography or the effects that their entrance would have on the marketplace.
The IT industry moves at what Fine calls a "high clockspeed." The IT industry experiences high
rates of innovation and these companies have the rapid product development and low cost
manufacturing capabilities required to compete and profit in these "high clockspeed"
environments. Polaroid never developed these organizational capabilities as they were not
needed in 40 years of competing in the film photography industry. These IT industry firms were
able to drive in rapid improvement of performance and affordability of digital camera products.
Polaroid's management again hesitated to invest in creating these capabilities due to distaste for
competing in such a highly competitive marketplace. Polaroid's inability to keep up with the
high rate of innovation and competitive pressure found in the newly defined digital photography
industry prevented them from competing effectively.
When faced with disruptive technology change, Polaroid's beliefs prevented management from:
* Reevaluating their value chain
o Who are their customers and how they value, purchase, and use the new product
o Who are their competitors and suppliers
* Correctly identifying an effective strategy for this new era
* Overcoming organizational inertia and committing to the new strategy
4. DoD's MOSA Procurement Strategy:
[Long-term relationships with industry] "need to be based on performance and
value-added, not based on barriers to entry that are artificially established to
minimize competition in the long run."
- U.S. Navy Secretary Donald Winder 11-18-2008
4.1. Objectives
The U.S. Department of Defense has three primary objectives for their Modular Open System
Architecture strategy:
Objective 1 - Rapidly and efficiently create new warfighting capabilities
The DoD has identified product complexity, changing system requirements, and variable funding
levels as root causes of poor program performance. Modular designs directly address these root
causes of poor program performance by accommodating uncertainty and reducing design risk.
Additionally, contractors may leverage the many benefits of modular design to improve
acquisition program performance. Concurrent engineering would greatly reduce the time
required to complete the design. The creation of product platforms would enable suppliers to
meet the DoD's needs will little to no investment in development. Standardized and open
interfaces also improve system interoperability, extensibility, reusability, and maintainability.
Product modularity may even enable Aerospace to increase the rate of product innovation
through the utilization of skill specialization and rapid experimentation. The DoD's MOSA
strategy has the potential to greatly improve its ability to create new warfighting capabilities.
Objective 2 - Provide access to world class design, production, operation and support
capabilities
Due to the complexity of the technology required and the procurement environment, the DoD is
currently limited in where it sources its warfighting capabilities. The DoD lacks the systems
engineering capability required to identify optimal system architectures that meet its needs.
Additionally, few companies outside of Aerospace have the organizational capability to manage
the complexity induced by the Federal Acquisition Requirements (FAR) or provide the secrecy
the DoD requires. Its inability to manage product complexity and the complexity of the
procurement process has essentially tied the DoD to Aerospace contractors.
Establishing standardized modular system architectures greatly reduces the complexity of
identifying optimal product configurations and would enable the DoD to drive the design
process. Additionally, modularity and openness would allow it to source the system modules
from firms that lack the ability to provide security. Simply defining the interface and functional
specifications of modules while providing few details of the rest of the system could provide the
DoD the secrecy it desires while greatly expanding its sourcing options.
However, standardized architectures do not exist for new warfighting capabilities and the DoD
must rely on Aerospace firms who have the capability to manage technology complexity, are
familiar with the DoD's product procurement and usage environment, and provide secrecy. This
position provides them significant competitive advantages as system architects and prime
integrators. These firms wish to capture as much value from design programs as possible by
supplying all of the design, production, and support services related to the program. Over the
course of the design process, the system architect builds additional positions that provide it
competitive advantages in capturing the rest of the value chain.
Product complexity and architectural coupling provide the architecting firm strong control of the
program's value chain. As the DoD lacks the technology capabilities to drive the design process,
it relies heavily on the architecting firm to select hardware and services to use in the product.
Strong inter-architectural coupling also limits the selection of hardware and software, often to
products supplied by the architecting firm. This monopolization of architectural information and
architectural coupling severely limits the DoD's ability to drive make/buy decisions and put the
architect in a position of selecting only products supplied by its firm. These positions also
provide the design firm competitive advantage in later production, support, and upgrade
contracts as well. The use of modular and open product architectures should reduce the prime
contractor's ability to establish these positions during the design process and monopolizing the
value chain. MOSA will enable the DoD to utilize world class design, production, and support
services, regardless if they are present in Aerospace or not.
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* Management of product complexity
* Mitigation of customer induced complexity
* Integrative capabilities
" Cradle to grave support
" Core competency in relevant technologies
Positions:
* System level information
* Architectural information
* IP ownership
* Experience
" Existing customer relationships I brand
Figure 24: Product Complexity, Architectural Coupling, and Intellectual Property Provide Aerospace Strong
Value Chain Control
While the DoD pays its contractors to develop cutting edge technology on its acquisition
programs, Intellectual Property claims often prevent it from leveraging this technology again on
other programs. The DoD often has to re-invent technology or design systems without access to
technology it paid to develop. The DoD plans to minimize the use of contractor owned
intellectual property on its systems and more effectively manage the IP it already owns to ensure
every program has access to the most advanced technology available.
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Objective 3 - Inject additional competitive pressure into the procurement process
Inter-contractor competitive pressure is main tool the DoD has to incentivize desired behavior on
acquisition programs. Standardized modular and open system architectures will provide more
firms the architectural information required to compete for procurement contracts.
Standardization will create the scale to incentivize firms from close activity networks to compete
for procurement contracts. The elimination of positions such as monopolization of product
information, architectural complexity, and IP ownership should prevent the prime contractor
from creating barriers to competition during the design process. Additionally, the presence of
standardized architectures will commoditize many of the unique technology capabilities
currently found in Aerospace. Without distinctive intellectual property or technology
competencies it will be very difficult for Aerospace firms to create unique sources of competitive
advantage and extract value from the DoD. MOSA has the potential to greatly increase the
competitive pressure in Aerospace.
4.2. Required customer capabilities
The Department of Defense requires additional procurement capabilities before it can
accomplish its MOSA objectives. The primary capabilities are:
* Joint service acquisition capabilities
* Modular and open system architectures
* Effective IP management capabilities
* Socialization of MOSA strategy
* Program evaluation and enforcement capabilities
Before the DoD can accomplish its goals, it requires several joint service acquisition capabilities.
Modularization and openness are strategies for leveraging economies of scale and learning. The
DoD must be able to identify opportunities to create scale between its various services and
acquisition programs by identifying similar warfighting needs that could likely be met with one
standardized modular product architecture. It must also build the capabilities to communicate,
collaborate, and coordinate between acquisition programs to manage cross development and
production activities. Joint acquisition programs, such as the Joint Strike Fighter program, are
going a long way in facilitating inter-service procurement capabilities. However, the
organizational cultures of the services make such collaboration difficult. The services often push
development towards designs tailored to their unique usage environments. Additionally, the
DoD currently lacks the systems engineering capability required to drive the scale identification
process.
In order to gain many of the promised benefits of MOSA, the DoD requires a standardized
modular and open system architecture. It will take some time to develop these architectures. As
indicated by the previous sections, an effectively modular architecture that delivered the desired
modularity of design, production, and usage capabilities would require a significant financial
investment by the DoD. Also, few systems provide the opportunities to create scale that would
make such investment economically viable. Yet, the DoD is currently funding several programs,
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such as the Radar Open System Architecture 2 (ROSA 2) program at the Lincoln lab, to create
these standardized modular and open architectures.
The DoD also must improve its effectiveness in managing the IP it has developed on its many
technology acquisition programs. As the DoD lacks effective inter-program communication
capabilities, it frequently pays contractors to develop technologies similar to what it already
owns. It must also be able to transfer the IP from one program to another supplier in order
benefit from economies of learning. The DoD is currently developing IP sharing capabilities
with systems such as the Navy SHARE system. These systems will help the DoD to accomplish
its MOSA goals, but will take some time to become adopted by the acquisition community.
The DoD's acquisition community is enormous and fragmented between services and technology
types and often operates without centralized control. Educating the acquisition community on
the DoD's MOSA strategy and coordinating procurement will be challenging. While the DoD
5000.2 procurement guidelines have been updated to reflect its desire to procure modular and
open weapon systems, it provides little guidance on how to evaluate weapon systems or
incentivize contractors to comply. It will take some time for the acquisition community to
develop the capability to evaluate a supplier's product architecture for MOSA compliance. The
DoD will go through several generations of products that are advertised as MOSA compliant, yet
fail to deliver the desired modular design, production, and usage capabilities. The acquisition
community will require additional program evaluation and enforcement capabilities before
MOSA will be effectively implemented.
While the original MOSA strategy was developed in the mid-1990s, it is only recently that
proposals have contained strong-MOSA language. Fully socializing the strategy within the
procurement community and developing the capabilities required to implement the strategy will
take some time and a sizeable financial investment by the DoD. However, the DoD has
committed to developing these capabilities and Aerospace has a limited transitional period before
MOSA is fully implemented.
4.3. Disruptive Nature of MOSA
Changes in products or changes in the competitive context can be disruptive to firm performance
if it is unable to recognize the change and develop the organizational capabilities required to
compete effectively in a new era. The DoD's MOSA strategy an embodiment of changing
customer values, new customer procurement and usage capabilities, and new product
architectures. Once MOSA is fully implemented, it represents an enormous change in the
competitive context. However, it is an extremely subtle change to the contractors that compete
in the Aerospace industry. MOSA will prove to be highly disruptive unless they anticipate the
change and develop strategies and capabilities required to effectively compete in this new era.
Henderson and Clark (1990) characterized various types of product configuration changes and
identified their disruptive potential for the firm. They would define the DoD's MOSA strategy
are Architectural Innovation, which has the greatest disruptive potential for industry incumbents.
Architectural innovations are changes in the product's architecture without changes to its core
components. Architectural innovations are often difficult for management to recognize or
predict the impact on the competitive context. This subtly also makes it difficult 
to overcome the
organizational inertia created by the established organizational design and 
to create the newly
required capabilities.
The maturity of the Aerospace industry and the organizational complexity 
of Aerospace firms
make them particularly susceptible to disruption from MOSA. These firms 
have been the DoD's
technology job shops for decades and are experts in converting the DoD's product requirements
into technology solutions. Using a wide array of technology competencies 
and organizational
capabilities, they deliver the warfighting capabilities its customer desires. 
In a way, MOSA is
simply an additional design requirement for system modularity and openness 
that must be flowed
into the design process. MOSA compliant products utilize the same components 
and capabilities
as their current products and simply allocate and interface these components 
in a new way. Few
additional organizational capabilities are required to supply the DoD MOSA 
compliant products.
MOSA's subtle shift in the competitive context will prove to be highly disruptive 
in Aerospace
unless contractors recognize the shifting competitive landscape and develop 
new sources of
competitive advantage.
4.4. Case - Modularization of Airborne Radar
Mechanically Scanned Arrays
The evolving architecture of airborne radars highlights the impact that MOSA 
may have on the
Aerospace industry. A product architecture that was once optimal for the contractor 
and evolved
to a higher performing architecture that is now suboptimal for the contractor, 
particularly in a
MOSA procurement environment. Airborne fighter radars were once mechanically 
scanned,
such as the APG-76 (see below), and were highly complex integrated systems. The architecture
of these systems comprised of several large subsystems.
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Figure 25: Mechanically Scanned Radar Architecture - Stimison, G. 1998
* Transmitter - generates the high power RF signal
* Waveguide - channels the transmitters energy to the antenna
* Duplexer - alternates access to the antenna between the receiver and transmitter
* Receiver - detects RF signals from the antenna
* Synchronizer - coordinates the operation of the transmitter and receiver
* Antenna - transmits and receives the signal
* Servo - mechanically steers the antenna
* Processor - the electronic controls for the rest of the radar and processes signals detected by
the receiver
While the architecture of the MSA looks to be comprised of discrete modules, the system is
highly integrated by several difficult to manage system functions and behaviors. The functional
allocation of transmitting and receiving signals is spread throughout the entire RF chain. The
complexity in managing the flow of RF signals in MSAs created strong integrative forces in the
system. Second and third order signals in RF equipment can easily become amplified within the
radar and overcome the system's ability to detect real targets. It is nearly impossible to predict
how two components would interact once integrated. The integration process for these systems
required highly skilled technicians and expensive test equipment and ranges. Effectively
managing RF signals in integration could provide enormous performance improvements to the
system.
The radar's operating environment also creates strong integrative forces in the system. Fighter
aircraft have tight size, weight, and power constraints which put strong limitations on the power
and sensitivity of the radar's components. Additionally, fighter aircraft nosecones experience
high temperature swings and lots of vibration. However, tight size and weight requirements
prevent radar designers from utilizing extensive heat or vibration management technologies. The
tight size, weight, and power constraints and operating environment puts a toll on the reliability
of MSAs and were typically among the most frequently failing pieces of equipment on an
aircraft. This conflict between radar performance and its operating environment places a
premium on the ability of the system architect to manage these many interdependencies that are
spread throughout the system.
The architecture of mechanically scanned radars presented several problems to their customers.
Rapidly slewing the antenna required large, complex, and powerful hydraulic systems that
required lots of power and induced more vibration into an already vibration-prone environment.
Depending on the location of the targets, the time required to mechanically steer the antenna
severely limits the number and quality of tracks provided by mechanically scanned radar.
Additionally, the hydraulic system is one of many single points of failure in mechanically
scanned radars and the tight size and weight constraints limit the architect's ability to include
redundancy.
Figure 26: APG-76 Mechanically Scanned Fire Control Radar - Source: Stimson, G. 1998
The product complexity and architectural coupling found in airborne radar provided the prime
contractor strong sources of value chain control. Even if the various elements were sourced from
third-parties, the quantity of architectural knowledge required to effectively integrate the pieces
would prohibit them from servicing the system once fielded. Additionally, few companies could
afford the expensive test equipment, testing ranges, and flight hours and provide all of the
technical capabilities required to integrate and validate these systems. Architectural complexity
and access to these resources provided radar houses such as Raytheon and Westinghouse
significant sources of competitive advantage. Additionally, the capabilities provided by these
systems are valued at a premium by the DoD as they are prime contributors to success of
platforms that perform crucial warfighting functions. These radar houses were highly profitable
as the value chain for airborne radars was enormous. However, while the DoD valued the
functionality that mechanically scanned radars provided, this architecture left much to be desired
in their performance, price, and reliability.
Electronically Scanned Arrays
Recent advances in electronics manufacturing have led to the evolution of airborne radar. The
functions provided by the MSA's large, analog, high power transmitter, receiver, duplexer, and
antenna have been repackaged into small, digital, low power Transmit / Receive (T/R) modules.
These T/R modules integrate a low power solid state transmitter, a low noise amplifier receiver,
and a phase shifter all into one easy to manufacture module and are the foundation of modern
Electronically Scanned Arrays (ESAs). Hundreds of identical T/R modules are combined
together on a backplane and work in unison to perform the radar's signal transmit and receive
functions. Unlike Mechanically Scanned Arrays, ESAs do not require that the array be
physically aimed at a target to detect it. ESAs utilize constructive and destructive interference
between the T/R modules to create a near instantaneous (<10 nanoseconds) steerable beam (+-
60 degrees).
Figure 27: F/A-22 AN/APG-77 Multi-function AESA - Source: NorthropGrumman.com
The modem ESA systems offer many benefits over MSAs. The additional timeline provided by
the rapid slewing of the ESAs beam greatly improves the quality and number of simultaneous
target tracks the radar can provide. The elimination of the MSA's hydraulic slewing system and
the associated vibration management technology, greatly improves the weight, cost, and
reliability of the system. In fact, ESAs can have extremely high system availability rates. ESAs
have much fewer single points of failure than MSAs and the interfaces between components are
of much lower power. The low power and solid state design of T/R modules give them high life
expectancy. Additionally, ESA architecture enables graceful degradation of the system as a
considerable percentage of T/R modules may fail before system performance is significantly
impacted. The expected lifecycle of modem ESA can be more than twice the lifetime of the
airframe it is attached to.
The ESA architecture enables effective management of the system behaviors and functions that
induced architectural complexity and coupling in MSA architectures. ESA systems are
significantly lighter and smaller than MSAs. The lack of moving parts minimizes the effects of
vibration. An ESA architect spends much less time managing these constrains and behaviors
that were so troubling in MSA systems. Additionally, the low power digital signaling between
ESA components greatly reduces the inter-module coupling of the modules. The T/R module
array is essentially decoupled from the rest of the system in the design domain, further reducing
design complexity. Decoupling the antenna from the remaining system has allowed the other
components to modularize as well. Power supplies and processing capabilities have modularized
and standardized as well.
This reduction in architectural complexity and inter-module coupling has had significant impacts
on the radar design process. The ESA architecture is highly scalable as the same basic
architecture can be reused for various levels of performance and operating conditions by simply
adding or subtracting components. The system architect can design more powerful and higher
accuracy radars by simply growing the number of T/R modules, power supplies, and processing
capabilities. While significant effort is still required to integrate and tune the system, the design
process of the various components is much more modular than it was in MSA systems.
Modularization of design teams have facilitated economies of scale and learning in the design
process. As a result, T/R module technology is rapidly improving and the improvements are
spread to many design programs.
Modularization of Radar Processing
Radar processors have provided similar functionality throughout the evolution of the radar.
Processors take the signal information and perform all of the complex mathematical operations
required to filter out signal noise and identify targets. Radar's signals travel at the speed of light
to and from their targets and can have several pulses simultaneously on their way. Performing
all of the calculations within this tight timeline can require enormous processing capabilities.
However, the size, weight, and power constraints of airborne radar can limit the processing
power available.
Radars have traditionally delivered the required processing power by identifying opportunities to
match the algorithms to the processing hardware. The performance improvements enabled
through optimization of software and hardware created strong integrative forces within the
processor. This tight integration necessitated the development of unique software to control
each radar system. However, recent advances in processing speed are beginning to decouple the
processor from the algorithms. Commercial processors are now fast enough that processing
resources can be abstracted from the algorithms used to control the radar. Reuse of algorithms
and radar control software is becoming much more common. A write-once-use-everywhere
platform should be available in the near future.
Potential Effects of MOSA
The evolution of airborne radar architecture has had significant impacts on the value chain for
these products. The modularization of the architecture has enabled many improvements in the
performance of the system. The reduced architectural complexity and reusable product
platforms have greatly improved the effectiveness of the design process. Modularization has
increased inter-program collaboration through the use of standardized power supplies,
processors, and arrays. Design programs for ESA radars are significantly shorter and inherently
less risky than MSA systems.
While program effectiveness has improved, reduced product complexity and architectural
coupling has significantly eroded Aerospace's value chain control for these programs. Third
parties frequently win support contracts for airborne radar subsystems such as power supplies
and processors. Historically, the prime contractor would eventually recapture these support
contracts as the third parties would lack the architectural knowledge required to effectively
support these products. However, additional modularization has increasingly enabled third
parties to win and keep these support contracts.
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MOSA threatens to accelerate this loss of value chain control. The DoD's procurement
community has recognized that the modularization of the radar offers many opportunities to
achieve higher economies of scale and learning outside of Aerospace. T/R module production
represents nearly half of the recurring cost of an airborne ESA. This cost could be significantly
reduced by leveraging additional production scale. Firms in industries such as
telecommunications and wireless networking have the relevant manufacturing capabilities and
access to enormous sources of production and procurement scale. ESA design programs are
increasingly under pressure to outsource T/R module production. While intellectual property
and proprietary interfaces currently tie T/R module production to the architecting firm, MOSA is
enabling the DoD to outsource these services.
Customers, such as the Navy's SEWIP program, have leveraged MOSA to facilitate the
decoupling of the value chain through the creation of modular and open system architectures that
would allow outsourcing of the production of these T/R modules. SEWIP's MOSA strategy is
to develop multiple sources of supply that would ensure competitive prices for the supply and
support of SEWIP throughout its lifecycle. SEWIP is not only lowering acquisition costs for its
program, but sowing the seeds of improved acquisition capabilities for other programs. SEWIP
is paying firms to develop the organizational capabilities required to design and produce T/R
modules, essentially growing competitors for Aerospace.
Unlike the system level performance of a radar, the customer valued performance metrics of T/R
modules are easier for customer to specify and evaluate. This objective evaluation of T/R
module performance combined with additional suppliers would greatly increase competitive
pressure. Aerospace firms currently lack the scale or manufacturing efficiency found in
consumer electronics industries. Without additional sources of competitive advantage,
Aerospace may one day lose T/R module design and production completely. This would be
highly disruptive as T/R modules now encompass many of the technology capabilities that are
currently the basis of competitive advantage between radar suppliers. These capabilities would
likely fade over time without in-house design and production of T/R modules.
The complexity and resources required to integrate ESA radars continue to provide the integrator
significant value chain control for the remaining design, production, and support services.
However, increased architectural stability and MOSA are enabling and incentivizing further
decoupling of the ESA architecture. Power supplies, processors, and software, which once
conveyed distinctive performance advantages, are increasingly becoming commodities. The
activity network and potential opportunities to create scale in airborne radar will continue to
grow. It may only be a matter of time before the technologies required to modularize production
and integration of ESAs are invented. The radar architectures that support modularity of design,
production, and use would greatly increase the competitiveness of the industry.
Airborne radars were once an ideal product from a business perspective. They were large
integrated systems that once designed, guaranteed decades of profitable business. The
modularization of airborne radar, while highly beneficial to its users, may prove to be extremely
disruptive to Aerospace's continued ability to profit from these systems. The MOSA
procurement environment will serve to accelerate this disruption.
5. Avoiding Architectural Disruption
5.1. Characterizing the Threat
MOSA's impact on Aerospace is likely to vary by company and product. As indicated in the
previous section, the DoD's ability to modularize procurement will be determined by the
inherent integrality of each product which extends beyond the purely technical design domain.
Legal, economic, or political forces may prevent the DoD from realizing the desired modularity-
enabled design, production, and usage capabilities. Additionally, the DoD has several
organizational capabilities that it must develop before achieving the goals of its MOSA strategy.
However, this uncertainty of how and when MOSA will impact Aerospace is the foundation of
disruptive threat. Firms must begin the process of preparing their organizations to meet the
challenge of disruptive change.
It is certainly possible that MOSA will have no effect on many Aerospace programs. Some
products are too inherently integral to enable modularity of design, production, or use
capabilities. Many of these weapon systems are one of a kind and few firms with the required
specialized capabilities exist outside of the prime contractor leaving few opportunities to access
external technology or scale. The costs of developing a standardized modular architecture or the
required inter-program communication and coordination capabilities may outweigh any
opportunities to leverage scale. Additionally, many of these systems are undergoing high rates
of architectural innovation. The performance benefits offered by architectural innovations might
outweigh the cost improvements of standardization. The optimal architecture for each
warfighting capability will be determined by the customer's preference for system performance
and affordability. While modular architectures might be appropriate for many applications,
integral products will be optimal for some systems.
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While MOSA may have little impact for some products, many systems present attractive
opportunities to create scale and leverage world-class capabilities found outside of the prime
contractor. The disruptive effects of MOSA for these systems can be characterized by its ability
to slow the rate of architectural innovation, the rate in which new component functions and
linkages are introduced. Products undergoing the fastest rates of architectural innovation are
driven by the high performance demands of their customers to identify opportunities to improve
product fitness by optimizing the choice and arrangement of components. These products hinder
standardization and limit opportunities to leverage scale as their components and interfaces are
constantly changing. Therefore, many products with high rates of architectural innovation are
less likely to be disrupted by MOSA.
For systems with currently low rates of architectural innovation, MOSA is unlikely to impact the
architecture of these products as they already offer opportunities to create scale. Additionally,
the ways in which DoD values and uses these systems will likely remain unchanged. However,
MOSA will likely reduce the prime contractor's value chain control and allow the DoD access to
competitors products and services. The products that will fall into this category of disruption
will be easy to identify and create effective strategies for.
MOSA is most disruptive for integral products with high rates of architectural innovation whose
changing customer performance / cost preferences now favor modular product architectures. In
a MOSA procurement environment, the benefits of additional modularity and standardization
now outweigh the performance benefits offered by the current architecture. For these products,
MOSA may bring about new modular and standardized product architectures. These new
product architectures will fundamentally change the ways in which the DoD values, purchases,
and uses the system have the greatest disruptive potential. Aerospace is a highly mature and
specialized industry. They have evolved complex enterprise architectures and sophisticated
organizational capabilities that match the current competitive context. This combination
organizational complexity and industry maturity will make it very difficult to assess the impacts
these new product architectures have on the competitive context and create effective strategies.
Standardized modular and open product architectures enable the following customer capabilities
with possibly disruptive effects on the competitive context:
* Ability of customer to match its needs to a system architecture
* Intra-program Coordination and collaboration of product development, production, and
support
* Ability to drive make / buy decisions - identify and evaluate customer valued capabilities
outside of the prime contractor
* Decoupling the production / support / upgrade services from the system architect
These new capabilities will likely change the ways in which the customer will value, procure,
and use your products and organizational capabilities. If modularity enables the customer to
match its needs to system architectures without the architect, it could significantly deteriorate the
customer's value for architecting capabilities. The acquisition community currently lacks the
ability to coordinate between programs or incentivize programs to work together. If the DoD
evolves the capability to value and incentivize coordination, contractors that can mitigate the cost
and complexity of inter-program coordination and collaboration will gain competitive advantage.
As systems become modular and contractors are unable to leverage positions to gain value chain
control, the contractors that deliver superior customer-valued capabilities will capture the
greatest value in the MOSA-era. Firms must be able to honestly assess how they currently create
and capture value and work towards developing new effective competitive strategies.
5.2. Products Likely Affected
Aerospace should anticipate changing competitive context by evaluating the DoD's desire and
ability to slow architectural innovation for each of their products. Guidelines for evaluating their
product portfolios should include the:
* Inherent modularization of the architecture
* Opportunities to create scale
* Ability of customers to drive architectural change
* Ability of suppliers to resist architectural change
Products have varying degrees of inherent modularity. Some products lack what Schilling calls
"synergistic specificity," meaning its components function relatively independently and can be
recombined in a variety of configurations with little loss of system performance. A home stereo
receiver is a good example of low synergistic specificity as its designers have a large number of
receiver components and architectures that would result in a product with the desired
performance.
Products with loose environmental operating constraints or low performance expectations
typically feature low synergistic specificity. For example, the performance required by an Indy
race car necessitates tight coupling between all components of the car to achieve the desired
performance. The selection of components such as side view mirrors may receive little attention
in commercial automobile manufacturing. Yet in Indy racing these components would require
significant engineering skills and expertise to assess the aerodynamic properties and weight
impacts on system performance. Products that feature low synergistic specificity or offer
adequate levels of performance are more likely to be impacted by MOSA.
Many products provide the DoD opportunities to create scale. Products that are members of
product families or have large production counts are obvious MOSA targets. Modules that
provide core functionality present in several different applications, such as power supplies, are
also likely to be standardized. Many programs contain sources of scale that are not immediately
obvious. For example, systems that require frequent servicing of components or utilize
consumables provide incentives to modularize. Additionally, systems that are comprised of
components with varying rates of incremental innovation benefit from modularization.
Modularity reduces the cost of incrementally improving the system over time as new
technologies become available. Firms should evaluate the opportunity to benefit from
economies of scale and learning throughout all lifecycle activities of the product. However, the
potential return from these opportunities to create economies of scale and learning must exceed
the investment required to achieve them. Therefore, systems with high system lifecycle costs
will be the primary targets for MOSA.
MOSAs impact on architectural innovation and Aerospace's value chain control heavily relies on
its customer's ability to drive architectural evolution. The architectural complexity of some
products is beyond the DoD's engineering capability. For example, it is very difficult to assess
system level performance impacts of design changes with airborne radars. Flight testing
completed radar is about the only way to verify that a change produces the desired effect. This
architectural complexity provides the architect / integrator firms strong control over the radar
architecture and prevents the DoD from changing the product or driving make/buy decisions.
However, the DoD may not need the technical capability to drive architectural change.
Aerospace is limited in who they can sell their products by U.S. export law. This legal barrier to
competition provides DoD oligopsony from which it derives strong market power over its
Aerospace suppliers. This competitive environment creates strong incentives to deliver their
products on the DoD's terms. This MOSA procurement environment is incentivizing firms with
weak sources of competitive advantage to identify innovative ways to provide the modularity-
enabled capabilities desired by the DoD. These firms are offering products that enable unique
modularity-enabled capabilities as sources of competitive advantage. Product architectures will
likely become increasingly modular and open over time as Aerospace firms compete to win
procurement contracts. Only suppliers that own difficult-to-replicate technology capabilities or
unique resources will be able to maintain their closed product architectures against obvious
benefits of scale.
5.3. Eroding Foundations of Competitive Advantage
Current foundations of competitive advantage for the DoD's technology acquisition programs
are based on unique organizational capabilities to manage product complexity. In fact, firm's
ability to profit from cost-plus technology development programs is directly derived from the
product's inherent complexity and its organizational capabilities to manage this complexity.
Negotiated profit of cost-plus contracts are largely dictated by the FAR's Weighted guideline
system which provides the government's acquisition team guidance and limits for negotiating
profit. The DoD's evaluation of the product's inherent complexity and the uniqueness of the
firm's ability to manage this complexity largely determines what profit percentage will be
allowed, typically 0 - 12% profit.
Contract Price = Negotiated Profit + Allowed Indirect cost + Management Reserve + Direct Cost
Management reserve is the programs risk budget, a pool of money set aside for the contractor to
use to mitigate technical, cost, or schedule problems as they materialize. Programs with large
inherent risks are allocated larger management reserves. As the contractor is able keep the
remainder of this budget once it meets the terms of the contract, management reserve provides
incentives for desired contractor behavior even in the absence of inter-supplier competition.
Management reserve is a significant source of Aerospace profit and can exceed the size of the
negotiated profit if the program is managed wisely.
If standardized modular architectures arise, the perceived architectural complexity of the product
and the uniqueness of a firm's technology competencies will fall. This will eventually lead to
lower negotiated profits. Additionally, modularity should improve the program's ability to
manage risks which could result in reduced management reserves for these contracts. A slowing
of architectural innovation and modularization is in itself disruptive for these cost plus products.
As the product architectures evolve, firms must create the organizational capabilities that
leverage architectural stability and take advantage of opportunities to leverage scale as they are
identified. If product architectures become standardized and the relevant technical capabilities
become widely available, the focus of competition may shift entirely from product innovations to
process innovation. If modularity sufficiently reduces the inherent complexity of these products,
the DoD may transition from cost-plus to firm-fixed-priced products. Such a shift would provide
firms with superior design process capabilities significant competitive advantage.
Firm roles and scope may shift with the foundations of competitive advantage. The architect /
integration role is currently desired positions in Aerospace as architectural knowledge typically
provides significant competitive advantage throughout the program value chain. However, the
value may shift to the component suppliers if the architecture modularizes. Modular products
could even allow the DoD to take over integration and repair services itself. Aerospace must
continually reevaluate their assumptions about the ability to capture value from these roles and
the customer's value for their organizational capabilities.
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5.4. Signals of Change
The DoD is lacking many of the organizational capabilities required to implement its MOSA
strategy. MOSA will take some time until its full impact is felt in Aerospace. As firms work
towards moving their organizations towards a state of MOSA preparedness, they should keep an
eye on the indicators of competitive context change:
* Emergence of new dominant designs
* Narrowing of customer valued product performance parameters
* Greater customer participation in make / buy decisions
* Expansion of the activity network
* Changes in firm scope
* Lower contract prices or profitability
* Transition from cost-plus to firm-fixed price contracts
In order to avoid disruption, firms should continually reevaluate their product architectures, the
ways in which the customer value, purchase and use these products, and the changing
competitive context in Aerospace.
5.5. Organizational Anchors
MOSA is an embodiment of changing customer values, new customer procurement and usage
capabilities, and new product architectures and represents an enormous change in the
competitive context. MOSA will prove to be highly disruptive unless Aerospace firms anticipate
the change and develop strategies and capabilities required to effectively compete. However,
several organizational anchors hinder their ability to identify changes in the competitive context
and develop effective strategies.
Polaroid demonstrated the organizational inertia that can develop over a long successful history
in a mature stable industry. Like pre-digital photography, Aerospace is also a mature stable
industry. Many of the products, industry competitors, and customers have been relatively
constant for decades. Aerospace's organizational architectures and cultural beliefs are strongly
adapted to this stable competitive context. As such, these firms lack strong organizational
capabilities for meeting the challenge of disruptive change.
MOSA is one of many DoD strategies to improve acquisition performance from the last two
decades. The relative small impact of procurement strategies such as COTS and Performance
Based Logistics have had on Aerospace has conditioned these firms to utilize "active waiting"
strategies rather than proactively responding to potentially disruptive threats. Additionally,
MOSA is a very subtle change as designing MOSA compliant products does not require new
organizational capabilities. In fact, at the program level, MOSA is simply a new set of customer
design requirements that must be flowed into the design process. The conditioned behaviors of
management combined with the subtlety of MOSA will hinder Aerospace's ability to avoid
disruption.
IBM demonstrated the need and complexity of developing successful new product strategies
aligned with the needs of the enterprise. The organizational architecture of the PC design team
allowed it to develop a product strategy that lacked enterprise alignment. Additionally, its
product strategy was based on incorrect assumptions about IBM's sources of competitive
advantage. While the PC was highly successful, its product strategy eventually had disastrous
effects on IBMs value chain.
Aerospace is facing similar challenges in enterprise communication and coordination of strategy.
Aerospace firms are enormous complex entities. Their product and technology scope enables
them to weather changing customer preferences for warfighting capabilities. Their
organizational architecture is aligned with mitigating the organizational cost of variability in
customer needs. However, the resulting organizational inertia and complexity will make it
difficult to effectively respond to MOSA.
Aerospace's activity network includes an enormous number of customers and suppliers. The
realizations of their products require the development of a vast number of technology and
operational capabilities. The size and complexity of these organizations creates pervasive causal
ambiguity. Few people have visibility into how their firm competes with its competitors or how
a product is transitioned from conceptual design to the battle field. The causal ambiguity will
prevent them from perceiving change in the competitive context and developing an effective
strategy.
Aerospace's function/customer matrix organizational designs reduce the cost of coordination and
managerial complexity involved in staffing new programs and reallocating personnel as these
programs are completed. These matrix organizations lean heavily towards satisfying individual
customers and away from functional organizations that create economies of scale or learning as
few enterprise incentives or opportunities to improve program performance through scale exist.
As MOSA is implemented, this customer leaning matrix organizational design will aid in
identifying changing customer values for the firm's products as it emphasizes customer
relationships and understanding chaining customer values. However, the customer leaning
matrix will hinder its ability to leverage any opportunities to create scale. Additionally, this
matrix design lacks strong product alignment. Each customer may procure a variety of products
and technologies, product category experts are spread throughout the organization. The only
organizations that specialize in a single product or technology are typically found in R&D groups
that have few connections with individual programs.
This organization design results in several organizational behaviors that are particularly
dangerous in a MOSA procurement environment. Programs are creating product architectures
with little coordination with those who develop enterprise technology strategies. Additionally,
the individual programs that are responsible for creating product strategy lack the resources or
incentives to create a coordinated enterprise strategy. As programs are primarily incentivized to
meet their customer needs, their products will likely deliver modular and open designs with little
consideration to future value chain impacts. IBM demonstrated the potential problems that may
arise from product strategies that lack enterprise alignment when the new product has the
potential to cannibalize the remaining products.
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Aerospace's enterprise architectures have several barriers that slow the rate at which information
is disseminated and new organizational behaviors can arise. As these companies are comprised
of firms from many acquisitions, they are large geographic and cultural divides between sites.
Additionally, security restrictions require that many employees work in secure closed locations.
As the DoD's values and the ways in which it procures and uses Aerospace's products change,
these barriers to communication will slow Aerospace's ability to socialize the change in the
competitive context and develop new organizational behaviors.
5.6. Effective Strategy Formation
Once the organizational anchors preventing assessment of the current foundations of competitive
advantage are cleared, Aerospace must turn to quickly identifying strategies that are effective in
this new competitive context. Strategy formulation can be divided into two product categories,
products with and without existing dominant designs. Firm roles, opportunities for
specialization, and foundations of competitive advantage are likely known in product categories
with dominant designs. Markets where the current products undergo high rates of architectural
innovation and lack dominant designs are more difficult to anticipate changes to the competitive
context. We shall examine effective strategy formation in both of these product categories.
Product Categories with Existing Dominant Modular Designs
Products that are currently modularized or have slow rates of architectural innovation likely
present obvious opportunities to leverage scale that lie outside of the current firm scope that are
attractive to the DoD. As MOSA erodes the current foundations of competitive advantage, it is
important to quickly develop new distinctive capabilities and positions. Effective strategies for
this product category are:
* Leveraging product modularity to create superior organizational capabilities
* Utilizing current positions to create capabilities that differentiate you from firms wishing to
enter your value chain
* Gaining control of valuable world-class capabilities found outside of your organization
As MOSA begins to erode the sources of competitive advantage, Aerospace must identify
opportunities to leverage product modularity and create organizational capabilities that are
superior to competitors. We have identified many ways in which modularity can improve design
and production process effectiveness. One of the best ways an organization can align itself with
modular and stable product architecture is through the utilization of product-oriented
organizational designs that can facilitate rapid incremental improvement of modules. When
appropriate, product-oriented organizational designs leverage the stability of product interfaces
and functions to create economies of scale and learning. These organizations facilitate the
communication and coordination that is so difficult achieve in Aerospace. This alignment of
enterprise and product architectures is essential in supporting many of the foundations of
competitive advantage in modular product industries.
These specialized product-organizations must create world-class capabilities in realizing
incremental innovations that improve their modules on non-commoditized performance
parameters. When this capability to innovate is based upon economies of scale and learning, it is
important to protect and expand current sources of scale. Finding new customers and markets
for these standardized components is an ideal way to create additional economies of scale.
MOSA itself presents one of the best ways to create economies of learning. The DoD intends to
put as much architectural information as possible in its IP repositories, such as the Navy's
SHARE system. Powerful organizational capabilities can be created through the accumulation
and dissemination of the architectural knowledge on these repositories.
As these new product-oriented organizations are developed, it is imperative that the firm
maintain the ability to identify and create architectural innovations. Innovation at the system
level is one of the best strategies for differentiating yourself in a field of commoditized products.
Product design organizations are incentivized to improve products around narrow ranges of
product performance parameters. Henderson and Clark (1990) identified how their specialized
processes, information filters, and incentive structures tend to limit their ability to identify and
realize architectural innovations.
While process optimization offered by product organizational designs are necessary, they are
insufficient to create sustainable competitive advantages where the required capabilities are
widely held and sizeable opportunities to capture value exist. Aerospace must create distinctive
and difficult to replicate capabilities to drive improvement of modules along non-commoditized
performance parameters. Aerospace's current experience, scope, and scale positions that may
enable these firms to create capabilities that differentiate them from firms wishing to enter their
value chains. For example, current customer relationships provide Aerospace insight to how
their customers value and use their products. This provides them an advantage in identifying
product parameters that are under-performing by the current generation of products.
Currently fielded products provide many opportunities to create unique organizational
capabilities that would be difficult to replicate by companies new to Aerospace. Aerospace firms
can leverage learning from the repair centers to deliver high-reliability products. Knowledge of
the customer's operating environment and confidence in estimating system reliability enables
Aerospace firms to provide product warranties and negotiate Performance Based Logistics
contracts that are highly desired by the DoD. Additionally, Aerospace has many opportunities to
create cost advantages through product reuse. Logistics handbooks and FAR documentation are
very expensive for the DoD to create. Training logistics personnel to effectively service systems
is also expensive. Reuse of fielded products can greatly reduce the DoD's total cost of
ownership.
It is unlikely a single Aerospace firm will be able to create all of the world-leading
organizational capabilities required to capture the entire value chain. When external world class
capabilities exist, firms should try to monopolize access to these capabilities if they are valuable
and difficult to replicate. Companies often utilize sourcing partnerships to obtain access to
needed organizational capabilities. For example, Ford outsources many of their engines and
transmissions to firms that have access to enormous sources of scale that Ford would be unable
to achieve on its own. Their suppliers enable Ford to reduce product costs and capture additional
value from their products. In return the suppliers are rewarded with stable sources of scale and
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non-commoditized profits. Securing access to these distinctive capabilities through synergistic
partnerships will provide firms positions of competitive advantage.
However, note that outsourcing components will eventually lead to diminished technical
capabilities over time. In contrast to Ford's outsourcing strategy, Honda utilizes its mastery of
engines and transmissions provide it competitive advantage through the design of products with
superior fuel efficiency and reliability. Outsourcing should be done strategically as many
technical capabilities are foundations of key sources of competitive advantage. Aerospace firms
are technology job shops, they are what they build. Cohen and Levinthal defined how a firm's
capacity to identify valuable innovations and create new products, its absorptive capacity, is
heavily path dependent. Outsourcing technology capabilities will eventually limit a firm's
absorptive capacity and its ability to drive customer valued innovations and its strategic options
as the competitive landscape evolves. Identifying and protecting these key technical capabilities
are an important piece of the strategy formulation process.
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Product Categories without Existing Dominant Modular Designs
Modular products enable firms to develop superior capabilities by creating economies of scale
and learning. As opportunities to specialize and create scale emerge, firm scope will likely
change. Modularity and openness greatly reduces barriers to market entry and may lead to
growth in the activity network. Increasing number of competitors and opportunities to create
economies and scale and learning will raise the rate and diversity of innovation. This change in
product architecture will have unpredictable impacts on the competitive landscape. It will be
difficult to predict who will create and capture value in this new competitive context.
Products that are modular in design, production, and usage incentivize specialization which
typically results in several unique industry roles; system architect, platform leader, module
player, and system integrator. Which roles capture value is determined by each product's
particular competitive landscape. We shall examine effective strategies that have been
developed for each role. However, note that many of these strategies have strong first-mover or
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scale advantages to them. It is imperative that as the competitive context shifts, firms quickly
move to where the value is being captured and implement the appropriate strategies.
---------- ........
Product Architect
It is the architect who creates the modularization design rules and defines the visible information
used by module designers. Architecting a modular product requires and develops broad
technical and operational capabilities that would enable it to move into any of the other firm
roles. The architect has a unique opportunity to initially determine the product architecture and a
temporary monopolization of architectural knowledge. Architecting the product is a valuable
position as the product architecture largely determines the firm's ability to capture value. By
aligning the product's architecture with the organization's current capabilities and positions
ensures that your foundations of competitive advantage are relevant with the new product. The
architect determines which modules have the largest contribution to system level performance.
Strategic functional allocation provides the architect competitive advantages in customer valued
modules. Introducing design dependencies that couple the modules where you have competitive
advantage to valuable modules that you lack competitive advantage may enable the firm to
extend its ability to capture value.
Sun Microsystems provided great examples of architectural strategies to capture value on a
modular product in competitive environments. They identified opportunities to tightly integrate
the processor and memory in a way that provided customer-valued performance improvements
and strong sources of platform control. This architecture was aligned with Sun's organizational
capability to rapidly innovate in processing design and develop operating systems that leveraged
these improvements. Additionally, Sun's product was strategically architected to facilitate low
cost manufacturing which provided it a cost advantage even though it utilized similar
components as its competitors. Sun's product architecture was able to strike a balance between
leveraging complements from other products while maintaining strong value chain control. Its
architectural strategy was highly effective.
The choice in product architecture should be make carefully as once the modular architecture is
defined, the network effects of standardization creates strong incentives to limit architectural
change. This limited ability to introduce architectural change can devalue the architect's
capabilities. IBM demonstrated this rapid devaluation of architectural knowledge once the
architecture is defined. Customers that were satisfied with the performance presented by the real
options of the current architecture valued only incremental module innovations. The architect
must identify new markets for its architectural knowledge. Customers that prefer performance or
cost levels that are unachievable by the current product are ideal markets for architectural
innovations. While IBM was displaced from the consumer PC market, it continues to leverage
its PC architectural knowledge to create super computers for large institutional customers.
IBM's mastery of the PC enables it to utilize its components in innovative ways that deliver
unmatched performance.
Unlike IBM, Apple was able to earn substantial profits from the commoditized PC platform. It
innovated in product usability and style, which were underperforming product parameters for
many customers. The architect may also avoid devaluation of its architectural knowledge by
raising the rate of architectural innovation. By constantly identifying customer-valued
innovation that required change the components and interfaces, the architect can reduce the
attractiveness of standardization.
Strategic value destruction is also an option of the architect. If the architect's firm lacks
competitive advantage in offering a customer-valued module, then it may choose to eliminate
competitor's ability to create distinctive positions. Open architectures and public availability of
architectural knowledge would make creating unique positions difficult and enables the customer
to capture additional value from these modules.
Platform leadership
The mission of the platform leader is to drive the evolution of the product architecture and its
business ecosystem to grow the size of the value chain and its piece of the pie. Platform leaders
influence the product and ecosystem by:
* Creating or adopting architectural innovations
* Aiding the success of your allies
* Preventing competitors from capturing value
For example, Intel heavily invests in creating and ensuring the adoption of architectural
innovations that improve the value of the PC platform. Intel invented the USB interface which
greatly aids the development and use of complements such as digital cameras and mp3 players.
Intel itself captures little value directly from the creation of USB. However, USB grows the total
PC value chain, indirectly benefiting Intel.
Platform leadership requires the help of complementors to become successful. In order to ensure
your choice of architectural innovations are adopted by the ecosystem, you must convince and
incentivize others to follow your lead. Ownership of platform interfaces and standards are
typical methods of obtaining platform leadership. However, MOSA presents few opportunities
to own architectural knowledge.
WHY - oly - modularity and openness - prevents you
Establishing a reputation as the ecosystem's "Thought Leader" can be an influential position
with customers and complementors and an effective strategy in a MOSA procurement
environment. IBM builds a reputation as a leader in supercomputing through public
demonstrations of its computing prowess, such as pitting its products in competitions with world
champion chess players.
Other methods of establishing a thought leadership position is to establish and lead relevant
standards setting bodies and excel at creating architectural innovations. Intel has repeatedly
demonstrated its ability to work with complementors and drive the adoption of their architectural
improvements. Its success has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Standards introduced by Intel
are assumed to eventually be included in the architecture by complementors. Incentivizing
complementors to adopt your architectural innovations is also an effective strategy. Creating an
installed customer base for your architectural innovation incentivizes the development of
complements that will make the new platform more attractive for additional customers. Also,
ensuring ecosystem stability for complementors improves the expected return of investing in new
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architectures. Superior execution or ownership of a core platform element can also provide
platform control. For example, Microsoft wields enormous power of the PC industry and
captures value from many of the customers and industry members through its ownership of the
PC's operating system.
Module player
The module players conform to the architecture, interfaces, and test protocols established by the
architect to deliver modules that excel at customer-valued performance metrics. Modularity
provides many firms access to the architectural information required to compete as a module
player. Additionally, competition between module players is focused around a small number of
key performance parameters. Firms in these roles struggle to create distinctive capabilities and
positions. However, these can be difficult to create as modularity enables firms to rapidly copy
the innovations of others.
The openness of MOSA compliant systems will make it especially difficult to create competitive
advantages based on ownership of interfaces and standards. However, innovating in non-
commoditized directions that are subjective or difficult for the customer to evaluate can provide
distinctive competitive advantage. Unlike architectural innovations, these incremental
innovations can be protected with intellectual property in a MOSA environment. MOSA allows
the ownership of module IP in order to incentivize investment in the platform, as long as this
ownership does not interfere with its DoD's modularity of use capabilities. It is important to
protect valuable innovation in module improvements. Aerospace firms must identify and fully
fund development activities that may result in valuable module IP as the DoD is entitled to rights
on any IP developed under contract. This is particularity important in a MOSA environment as
architectural knowledge repositories will transfer these innovations to your competitors.
Integrator
The integrator identifies customer needs that are achievable within the real options presented by
the modular product architecture. These firms then leverage product modularity and a wide
selection of components to rapidly and affordably meet these diverse customer needs.
Modularity greatly reduces the cost and complexity of the integrator's required capabilities.
Therefore integrators have few distinctive sources of competitive advantage and typically
compete through optimization based strategies. It is important that integrators develop superior
procurement, integration efficiency, and customer service capabilities. As these capabilities are
strongly benefited by economies of scale, integrators are under constant pressure to identify new
sources of scale.
As integrators have direct customer interaction, they are in a unique position to understand how
their customers value, purchase, and use the product. Integrators should develop strategies that
leverage this position. For example, Dell created competitive advantage in the home-PC market
by providing excellent customer service even when faced with strong price competition.
Integrators should look for opportunities to create such distinctive positions. Strategic
partnerships with complementors or customers would provide it these positions. As there are
strong economies of scale benefits to integration of modular products, it is likely that a single
integrator per product platform would exist in Aerospace.
5.7. Key Takeaways
There are few key ideas that the reader should take away from this paper:
1. MOSA is NOT just new technical requirements, it is an embodiment of changing customer
values and new procurement capabilities
2. Aerospace should anticipate a change in ways in which their customers value, purchase, and
use their products
3. Contractors that deliver the specialized capabilities desired by its customers will capture
greater value from programs
4. Organizational beliefs will determine Aerospace's ability to effectively respond to MOSA
As the DoD implements its MOSA strategy and new product platforms emerge, Aerospace must
re-evaluate their products, processes, organizational designs, and behaviors. It is imperative that
they quickly begin to create new sources of competitive advantage that will help them maintain
value chain control. As opportunities to create scale arise, they should leverage architectural
standardization and modularity to create superior program execution capabilities. Their
reputation as through leaders and current scope and scale can provide them significant sources of
competitive advantage in this new era. Yet these positions will erode without action from their
management.
Don't do a Polaroid
Re-evaluate your beliefs about the world!
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